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ABSTRACT 
The Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers required 
fusion centers to establish programs to interact with the private sector. These programs 
took the form of Public and Private Sector outreach programs. This requirement had a 
profound budgetary and operational impact on fusion centers, but agencies received very 
little guidance about how to plan, organize, and sustain these programs. 
 The goal of this thesis was to identify smart practices and create an operational 
blueprint that fusion centers and intelligence units could use to establish a successful 
private sector outreach program. Three nationally recognized programs were studied and 
evaluated by a panel of subject-matter experts. The group identified six fundamental 
components that executives should consider prior to establishing a program: determine if 
the host agency has the expertise to manage the program, assess the agency’s culture to 
identify it’s willingness to interact with the business community, establish sustainable 
funding mechanisms prior to implementing the program, use a hybrid approach to 
communication including websites and face-to-face meetings, fully understand the value 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have made great strides 
in sharing information with one another since the attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2011. One of the mechanisms that many states and regions turned to in an attempt to 
accomplish this goal was the formation of fusion centers. Much has been written about 
the effectiveness and approach of many of these centers, but little has been detailed about 
the impact, or lack thereof, of how public enterprise fits into the puzzle. Do private 
corporations and businesses have a significant role to play in the fight against terrorism in 
the United States?  Many law enforcement professionals think they play a critical role, 
and have attempted to integrate them directly into the fusion center intelligence cycle. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a number of think tanks 
and Congressional committees have weighed in on the topic of public and private 
partnerships with fusion centers. In 2006, U.S. DHS released a policy document entitled, 
The National Fusion Center Guidelines, and noted fusion centers should “involve every 
level and discipline of government, private sector entities, and the public.”1 
The consensus of government agency reports is that private industry and public-
sector organizations play a critical role in homeland security.2  There are three commonly 
cited reasons for this; private companies own the majority of the critical infrastructure in 
the United States and can provide expert analysis of vulnerabilities, private company 
security components can provide a mechanism to report suspicious activity to law 
enforcement, and partnerships with the private sector can provide law enforcement a 
direct conduit to educate employees regarding threats and propose mitigation strategies 
                                                 
1 U.S. DHS -NFCG, National Fusion Center Guidelines (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006), www.it.ojp.gov. 
2 Ibid. 
 2 
Establishing relationships between law enforcement entities and private partners 
is the best way to facilitate an open dialogue; thereby, increasing the probability 
companies will report suspicious activity to the police.3 
The private sector can provide law enforcement and fusion centers assistance and 
services not traditionally utilized in criminal intelligence centers. This support can take 
the form of subject-matter experts in the fields of cyber security and computer operations, 
or sharing of data on critical infrastructures or business capabilities that could benefit 
command staff during response to a hazardous materials incident.4 
The private sector owns or controls the great majority of the country’s critical 
infrastructure, and therefore, has expertise on the risks and vulnerabilities to those 
properties and installations.5  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is required by 
federal law to evaluate vulnerabilities, disseminate advisories and bulletins, and 
coordinate with the private sector and state, local, and tribal agencies in an effort to 
effectively prevent, or respond to terrorist threats.6  Therefore, partnering with 
representatives from key private industries would allow fusion center personnel to learn 
processes and operational capabilities, and apply that knowledge to develop strategies to 
mitigate threats.7 
In 2006 and 2007, several Congressional committees requested information from 
state and local-operated fusion centers in an attempt to assess their operational 
capabilities and effectiveness. The Congressional Research Service surveyed forty fusion 
                                                 
3 U.S. DOJ-ISE, U.S. Information Sharing Environment, Guideline 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government, Office of the President, 2006), www.ise.gov. 
4 U.S. DHS -NFCG, National Fusion Center Guidelines. 
5 DHS-HSAC, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force: 
On Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector- Final Report (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2005). 
6 U.S. DOJ-NCISP, National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2009), www.it.ojp.gov. 
7 U.S. DOJ-ISE, U.S. Information Sharing Environment, Guideline 2. 
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centers and issued several comprehensive reports on different aspects of fusion center 
operations and potential causes for concern.8 9 
The research and testimony provided to the committees echoed a number of the 
federal reports in highlighting the theoretical advantages of government and private-
industry partnerships in fusion centers. The authors, however, were skeptical about the 
practical application of the recommendations and discovered most fusion centers were 
not making progress integrating private sector participants directly into the centers.10 
The reasons outlined in the reports included law enforcement’s lack of 
understanding and appreciation for the role the private sector could play in a fusion 
center, and the federal government’s failure to provide a clear strategy.11  Conversely, the 
private sector has major concerns about participating in a fusion center, including the fear 
of industrial espionage, exposing weaknesses to competitors, and a clear lack of 
government safeguards and protections.12 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is very concerned about the 
development of fusion centers, and addresses private partnerships directly in their report, 
What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers.13  The report states, “Some fusion centers 
incorporate private-sector corporations into the intelligence process, potentially 
undermining privacy laws designed to protect the privacy of innocent Americans, and 
increasing the risk of a data breach.”14 
                                                 
8 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options 
for Congress, by Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins., CRS Report RL34177 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 19, 2007). 
9 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Intelligence:  
Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, by Todd Masse., CRS Report RL34070 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 2007. 
10 Siobhan O’Neil, “The Relationship Between the Private Sector and Fusion Centers:  Potential 
Causes for Concern and Realities,” Homeland Security Affairs Journal, no. Supplement 2 (2008). 
11 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, 
and Approaches 
12 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, 5–7, 29, 55–56, 83. 
13 “More about Fusion Centers | American Civil Liberties Union,” http://www.aclu.org/spy-files/more-
about-fusion-centers (accessed 11/18/2011). 
14 Ibid. 
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Taking the current literature and direction from the federal government into 
account, the questions that arise are:  
1. What are the fundamental components to be considered when developing 
a private partnership program for a fusion center?   
2. What are the key operational components that make a program successful? 
3. What smart practices can be employed when implementing a 
program for a small fusion center? 
 
4. What are the advantages and limitations of the electronic systems 
fusion centers use to collaborate with program participants? 
A number of fusion centers have initiated extensive private partnership and 
outreach programs that many intelligence practitioners believe only work under certain 
circumstances. For instance, many small fusion centers do not enjoy the luxury of having 
available staff to manage and engage with private sector outreach programs that require 
regular meetings and briefings. These types of programs take a tremendous amount of 
daily preparation, gathering of critical information to share with participants, and time 
and expense to arrange meeting space and facilities. Often times, only large, well-funded 
fusion centers can implement a program of that size and scope. 
A number of outreach programs are centered on Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO), or 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Programs. These programs often involve training a 
cadre of police officers or first responders to interact with members of the public and 
private sectors, usually arranged and sorted into groups corresponding to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s eighteen critical infrastructure and key resource 
sectors.15 The FLO programs present the same challenges to small fusion centers, 
especially when the small fusion center serves law enforcement agencies and 
jurisdictions that cover a large geographic area. Again, much has been written about these  
 
 
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Integrating Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
Protection Capabilities into Fusion Centers, Development and Implementation Considerations, Version 1.0, 
(Washington, DC, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 2011). 
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programs, but little has been reported about the effectiveness and impact the programs 
bring the communities, considering the time and expense needed to initiate and sustain 
these programs. 
This research will attempt to identify smart practices for implementing robust 
private partnership programs and attempt to customize a model program that addresses 
the unique needs of small fusion centers. Recognizing that many fusion centers have 
specific missions based on local needs and threats, these programs can take many forms, 
and aim to accomplish particular results and outcomes. Extensive research is needed to 
identify scalable programs that can be customized to fit the size, need, budget, and level 
of oversight available to allow the program to succeed and accomplish the stated mission 
of the particular center. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the fact that many fusion centers have implemented programs with the 
sole purpose of engaging and interacting with public and private enterprise, this research 
will attempt to answer the following questions:  
• What are the fundamental program components fusion center 
program managers consider when developing a successful private 
partnership program? 
 
• What smart practices can be employed when implementing a 
program for a small fusion center? 
 
• What are the advantages and limitations of the electronic systems 
fusion centers use to collaborate with program participants? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction and Background 
Law enforcement agencies have been forced to change the way they do business 
in the years following the 9/11 attacks, and the most significant example of this are the 
methods used to collect and analyze criminal intelligence. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, many 
metropolitan police departments operated a criminal intelligence unit in one form or 
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another. The main function of these units historically involved gathering data on gang 
members, organized crime figures, and suspected narcotics traffickers.  
When the National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA) was 
established in 1990, many of the existing units were enhanced and encouraged to 
collocate analysts and investigators from federal, state, and local agencies into a common 
office space. These “Intelligence Support Centers” were regional in nature, and agencies 
were required to collaborate within the space, produce strategic and tactical intelligence 
products, and provide an electronic mechanism to share this data with participating 
agencies within their region. This framework was extremely successful, as it allowed 
intelligence obtained from three levels of government to be “fused” together to create a 
common threat picture. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States made a number of sweeping recommendations, one of which was that the 
intelligence community made mistakes and information sharing needed to drastically 
improve. In responding to this call to action, many states and large city police 
departments decided to create Terrorism Fusion Centers. These centers were similar to 
the HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers but had a wider collection and dissemination 
function, and incorporated additional partners relevant to the homeland security mission. 
The primary focus of these centers was terrorism intelligence, but many morphed into 
“all-crimes-all threats” platforms.  
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a policy document entitled, 
The National Fusion Center Guidelines, and noted fusion centers should, “…involve 
every level and discipline of government, private sector entities, and the public…”16 
This statement begs the following question: How should fusion centers and law 
enforcement agencies engage with, and share intelligence with public institutions and the 
private sector? 
                                                 
16 National Fusion Center Guidelines, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 
2006. 
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This literature review will examine publications and articles related to current 
relationships between fusion centers and the public and private sectors, and issues 
involving the assignment of non-law enforcement participants into fusion centers.  
2. Findings and Claims 
Much of the literature examined for this review falls into three broad categories: 
reports written by government agencies or government entities, reports or studies written 
for the U.S. Congress, or journal articles written to examine specific aspects of fusion 
centers and their capabilities.  
3. Government Publications 
The consensus of the government agency reports is that private industry and 
public sector organizations play a critical role in homeland security.17  Establishing 
relationships between law enforcement entities and private partners is the best way to 
facilitate an open dialogue; thereby, increasing the probability companies will report 
suspicious activity to the police.18 
The private sector can provide law enforcement and fusion centers assistance and 
services not traditionally utilized in criminal intelligence centers. This support can take 
the form of subject-matter experts in the fields of cyber security and computer operations, 
or sharing of data on critical infrastructures or business capabilities that could benefit 
command staff during response to a hazardous materials incident.19  
The private sector owns or controls the great majority of the country’s critical 
infrastructure, and therefore, has expertise on the risks and vulnerabilities to those 
                                                 
17 National Fusion Center Guidelines, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 
2006. 
18 U.S. Information Sharing Environment, Guideline 2, United States Office of the President, 
Washington, DC, 2006. 
19 National Fusion Center Guidelines, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 
2006. 
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properties and installations.20  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is required by 
federal law to evaluate vulnerabilities, disseminate advisories and bulletins, and 
coordinate with the private sector and state, local, and tribal agencies in an effort to 
effectively prevent, or respond to terrorist threats.21 Therefore, partnering with 
representatives from key private industries would allow fusion center personnel to learn 
processes and operational capabilities, and apply that knowledge to develop strategies to 
mitigate these threats.22 
4. Reports for Congress 
In 2006 and 2007, several congressional committees requested information from 
state and local-operated fusion centers in an attempt to assess their operational 
capabilities and effectiveness. The Congressional Research Service surveyed forty fusion 
centers and issued several comprehensive reports on different aspects of fusion center 
operations and potential causes for concern.23,24  
These products echoed the federal publications in highlighting the theoretical 
advantages of government and private-industry partnerships in fusion centers. The 
authors however, were skeptical about the practical application of the recommendations, 
and discovered most fusion centers were not making progress integrating private sector 
participants directly into the centers.25  
                                                 
20 Homeland Security Advisory Council, Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force: On 
Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector- Final Report, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2005. 
21 National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, Washington, DC, 2009. 
22 U.S. Information Sharing Environment, Guideline 2. United States Office of the President, 
Washington, DC, 2006. 
23 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Core Issues and 
Options for Congress, by Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins., CRS Report RL34177 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 19, 2007). 
24 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Homeland Security Intelligence:  
Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, by Todd Masse., CRS Report RL34070 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, September 2007. 
25 Siobhan O’Neil, “The Relationship Between the Private Sector and Fusion Centers: Potential 
Causes for Concern and Realities.” Homeland Security Affairs Journal, Supplement 2 (April 2008). 
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The reasons outlined in the reports included law enforcement’s lack of 
understanding and appreciation for the role the private sector could play in a fusion 
center, and the federal government’s failure to provide a clear strategy.26  Conversely, the 
private sector has major concerns about participating in a fusion center, including the fear 
of industrial espionage, exposing weaknesses to competitors, and a clear lack of 
government safeguards and protections.27 
Siobhan O’Neil exposes serious concerns about private-public-government 
partnerships in her article, The Relationship between the Private Sector and Fusion 
Centers:  Potential Causes for Concern and Realities.28  O’Neil examines the issues 
posed by an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report criticizing fusion center 
partnerships as being reckless and labeling them a “bad idea.” The group is fearful 
private companies will provide private information to the government without proper 
legal oversight and might use this leverage to gain an unfair business advantage over 
companies that do not participate in sharing initiatives.29  
O’Neil’s research indicates information exchange between the private sector and 
fusion centers is very infrequent, and usually occurs after a crime occurs or during an 
event, as opposed to the fusion center method of sharing intelligence before the event or 
crime occurs. O’Neil, however, worked to address many of the concerns raised by the 
ACLU when she reported many states have legal restrictions in place to protect private 
data, and law enforcement agencies are attempting to find ways to work with industry 
representatives in a way that protects civil liberties.30 
5. Journal Articles 
Many of the journal articles examined the role of a specific non-traditional fusion 
center partner, such as fire department and EMS personnel. The literature indicates 
                                                 
26 Masse, “Homeland Security Intelligence.” 
27 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, “Fusion Centers:  Issues and Options for Congress.” 




firefighters have a unique role in homeland security, as they are often in homes and 
businesses providing emergency aid, and in a position to see illegal or suspicious 
activity.31 Firefighters expressed the desire to participate in the intelligence sharing 
process, as they routinely access areas not available to law enforcement and feel their role 
as “intelligence sensors” would be a valuable asset.32 
Concerns raised about Emergency Management Services (EMS) personnel 
participating in fusion centers included the lack of significant discussion between the 
federal government and the medical community regarding best practices and negative 
perceptions the partnerships may invoke by the public.33  
The benefits to the private sector may outweigh the theorized value to the 
intelligence community. Many fusion centers provide threat briefings and redacted 
publications to industry security professionals,34 while some provide a desk and 
computer equipment to be used by company representatives during emergency 
situations.35  Other benefits include access to training to help industry specific 
representatives learn how to identify suspicious activity and provide them with a secure 
mechanism to report. Additional training topics could include updates on terrorism 
planning trends and resources to assist them in creating emergency response plans.36   
Anthony Newkirk has serious concerns about public-private partnerships and 
outlines several in his article in Surveillance & Society.37  Newkirk believes fusion 
centers, if allowed to have close relationships with the private sector, will lead the 
country into a “surveillance state.”  Newkirk notes, “I argue that fusion centers, 
                                                 
31 Bryan Heirston, “Firefighters and Information Sharing; Smart Practice or Bad Idea.” Homeland 
Security Affairs Journal 6, no. 2 (May 2010). 
32 Michael Petrie, “Use of EMS Personnel as Intelligence Sensors:  Critical Issues and Recommended 
Practices.” Homeland Security Affairs Journal 3, no. 3 (September 2007). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Dave Shepherd, “Role of the Private Sector in Fusion Centers.” Security 48, (January 2011). 
35 O’Neil. “The Relationship Between the Private Sector and Fusion Centers.” 
36 Shepherd, “Role of the Private Sector in Fusion Centers.” 
37 Anthony B. Newkirk, “The Rise of the Fusion-Intelligence Complex: A Critique of Political 
Surveillance after 9/11.” Surveillance & Society 8, no. 1 (2010): 43. 
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decentralized intelligence-gathering activities mainly run by state and local police 
departments with federal and corporate support, are byproducts of the privatization of 
state surveillance and means of assault on civil liberties.”38 
In January of 2012, The National Infrastructure Advisory Council published one 
of the most comprehensive reports on the issue of private companies participating with 
the government on homeland security issues. The council is a panel of private-sector 
appointees that represent the 18 critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sectors 
of American business enterprise. In their report titled, Intelligence Information Sharing: 
Final Report and Recommendations,39 the council makes several key recommendations 
that include interaction with fusion centers and homeland security professionals. The 
report strongly endorses the relationships between companies and fusion centers and 
expressed concern the government is not going far enough in exploiting the programs.40 
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research will be conducted in three steps. The first step is a case study of 
three successful private partnership initiatives. During this first step, program managers 
will be interviewed in order to identify what they perceive as fundamental program 
components that make their programs successful. In addition, program managers will be 
asked about federally funded electronic collaboration systems to determine advantages 
and limitations of the system’s functionality. Step two will involve convening a focus 
group of subject-matter experts to analyze the data collected from the interviews and to 
identify common operational components and smart practices employed by the programs. 
The subject-matter experts will be asked to analyze these programs to determine if they 
could be employed in a small fusion center, and to make recommendations regarding 
which operational components and strategies should be considered in creating a blueprint 
                                                 
38 Anthony B. Newkirk, “The Rise of the Fusion-Intelligence Complex: A Critique of Political 
Surveillance after 9/11.” Surveillance & Society 8, no. 1 (2010): 43. 
39 Alfred R. Berkeley, Intelligence Information Sharing: Final Report and Recommendations. 
Washington, DC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2012. 
40 Ibid. 
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to establish a successful program. Lastly, step three will consist of evaluating the 
recommendations from the focus group to construct a model program blueprint that can 
be used by small fusion centers or intelligence units to establish a successful private 
partnership program. 
The case study method is appropriate to identify the fundamental program 
components of successful fusion center partnership programs that can be effectively 
established in a small fusion center operation. A case study will focus on the 
identification of smart practices, communication strategies and funding mechanisms. This 
method will also be used to analyze the advantages and limitations of electronic systems 
used by fusion centers to collaborate with program participants. Quantitative analysis 
would not be an effective approach, as statistics and data would be difficult to produce in 
examining relationships, communication strategies, and key decision-making practices. 
Fusion centers come in many different sizes and configurations, and applying a 
qualitative approach to compare programs in an attempt to explain why a program is 
successful, or why a program appeals to a particular program participant, would not be 
realistic. 
1. Data Sample 
The three cases selected for this study are the Orange County Shield, the 
InfraGard Los Angeles Program, and Colorado’s RUBICON program.  
Several fusion center directors and law enforcement executives recommended 
examining these programs because they have been widely recognized as successful, 
unique, and encompass a variety of participants and strategies. These programs have 
many things in common but also employ unique program features worth investigating. 
For instance, a different level of government operates each program: one federal, one 
state, and one county. Two programs encompass large metropolitan areas; the third’s 
jurisdiction is an entire state, and all three use different techniques to communicate with 
program participants. All programs have gone through rough times and had functions that 
failed or did not work properly, causing program managers to re-evaluate processes and 
utilize subject-matter experts from other state and federal programs to improve their 
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approach. Lastly, all three use different funding mechanisms to sustain their operations, 
and one uses private funding to offset operational costs. 
2. Data Collection 
Data will be collected regarding fundamental operational components of each 
private partnership and how decisions were made from an executive level to design and 
implement the program. Information will be gathered on how participants were originally 
selected, how management determined what communication and collaboration systems to 
use, and what processes failed and which ones worked and why.  
This thesis will also focus on analyzing the process managers and planners use to 
select particular infrastructure sectors to work with.  
Lastly, collecting information about the method agencies used to obtain funding, 
and how they plan to sustain operations in difficult budget environments will be 
addressed. This is especially critical for small fusion centers with limited funding and 
operational space.  
Subject-matter experts (the program managers) will be interviewed to gather the 
majority of data mentioned above. These managers from the selected samples will be 
interviewed regarding communication techniques, identifying participants, security 
arrangements and background checks, and the process for disseminating sensitive data to 
participants.  
Program managers are key to this study, as they are in the position to fully 
understand the internal components of the program. Managers understand how and why 
the program was designed, what information is exchanged, how individual relationships 
effect the operations, and what it takes to fund and sustain the program.  
See Appendix A for a list of interview questions. 
3. Data Analysis 
The data collected for this thesis will be analyzed in a unique fashion. A focus 
group of subject-matter experts will be assembled consisting of three current law 
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enforcement executives. Each member has extensive experience in managing grant 
programs, participating on executive boards, and overseeing multi-agency initiatives. In 
addition, all three members represent different sectors of the criminal justice profession. 
One is currently an Assistant Chief from a large metropolitan police department, one is a 
Director of a National Counterdrug Grant program, and the third is a General Counsel 
Attorney working for a federal drug enforcement agency. 
The data collected during the interviews will be sorted and divided into a number 
of core categories representing operational functions of the individual programs. The data 
will be presented to the focus group in a “blind review format,” and members will not 
know the name of the program or the person from where the data was collected.  
Data will be sorted into the following categories: 
 Background Information 
o Size of the program (number of participants) 
o Goal of the program (Intelligence Gathering/Situational awareness/ 
 Training 
o Key features 
o Geographic scope 
 Costs and Funding 
o Total start-up cost 
o Continuing operational costs 
o Funding source 
o Funding sustainment strategy 
 Participation 
o Total fusion center employees needed to manage the program 
o Type of companies targeted for participation 
o How participants are chosen 
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 Operations 
o Security protocols and background checks 
o Structure of the program (In fusion center/virtual/ live meetings) 
o Collaboration tool used 
o Communication methods used 
o Tip and leads management method 
o Information dissemination strategy 
o Types of products and publications produced 
o Marketing method and strategy 
o Policy documents and agreements 
o Statistics and reporting 
o Type of program oversight 
o Employee Management and Relationships 
 Lessons Learned 
o Avoiding Mistakes 
The focus group will be asked to analyze the sorted data and identify the 
components and other critical functions that they determined made the sample programs 
successful. It is possible that individual components and their functionality in relationship 
to a successful program could overlap, or affect one of the other components. This topic 
will be discussed with the panel, and components that are identified as being critical or 
distinctive in relation to other functions will be explored and reported. 
The focus group will be important to this study, as they can observe the program 
independently, and attempt to understand how programs compare to one another without 
emotional attachment or bias. In addition, these experts understand the goals and 
requirements outlined by the Department of Homeland Security, and how each program 
fulfills fusion center baseline capability requirements.  
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Lastly, the panel will be asked to identify “smart practices” that the author will 
use to make recommendations that can be used as a blueprint by managers representing 
small fusion centers, intelligence programs, or rural law enforcement agencies preparing 
to implement a private partnership program. 
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II. FUSION CENTER OVERVIEW 
A. WHAT IS A FUSION CENTER? 
For a well-rounded understanding of the purposes of this research, it is important 
to understand what a fusion center is, how fusion centers operate, and how they currently 
interact with public and private entities.  
The history of fusion centers begins in the early-1990s, when many metropolitan 
police departments operated a criminal intelligence unit in various forms. Historically, 
the main function of these units involved gathering data on gang members, suspected 
narcotics traffickers, and organized crime figures.  
When the National High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program (HIDTA) was 
established in 1990, many of the existing intelligence units were enhanced and 
encouraged to collocate analysts and investigators from federal, state and local agencies 
into a common office space. These “Intelligence Support Centers” were regional in 
nature, and participants were required to share criminal intelligence within the space—
then disseminate publications and products to program initiatives in their region. This 
framework allowed intelligence obtained from three levels of government to be “fused” 
together to create a common threat picture. For instance, intelligence gathered by 
detectives from a local police department can be compared to information on file at the 
local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office. An FBI analyst assigned to the fusion 
center can conduct a custom query and share the results with special agents assigned to 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Prior to the advent of fusion centers, common 
intelligence gathering by local agencies was rarely shared with federal agencies, and 
many connections are criminal commonalities that were probably missed. 
Between 2003 and 2007, direction from the Office of the President and the 9/11 
Commission led many states and large city police departments to create Terrorism Fusion 
Centers. These centers were similar to the HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers but had a 
wider collection and dissemination function, and incorporated additional partners relevant 
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to the homeland security mission. The primary focus of these centers was terrorism 
intelligence, but many morphed into “all-crimes-all threats” platforms. 
In 2005, the United States Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the United 
States Department of Homeland Security published the seminal document on fusion 
centers and fusion center operations. This document, formally titled, “Fusion Center 
Guidelines,”41 is a series of formal recommendations and guidelines distributed to fusion 
center managers and agencies in an attempt to standardize fusion center operations across 
the nation. According to the guidelines; the formal definition of a fusion center is as 
follows:   
A Fusion Center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 
provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center with the goal 
of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and respond to 
criminal and terrorist activity.42 
The primary function of a fusion center is to act as a centralized operations center 
where information can be collected from a myriad of sources, analyzed by a cadre of 
professionally training criminal intelligence analysts, then disseminated to first 
responders, investigators, and other participants in an effort to anticipate, identify, 
prevent and monitor criminal activity.43 
The principal leadership role in most fusion centers is handled by a law 
enforcement agency. Most centers are operated by a state law enforcement agency (such 
as a state police department or Attorney General’s Office), however, a number of large 
metropolitan agencies host centers, as does the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Each fusion center has been custom designed to meet the investigative needs of 
the agencies and customers with the given region. For this reason, each center has unique  
 
                                                 
41 Fusion Center Guidelines, United States Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the United States 
Department of Justice, and the United States Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, July 
2005. 
42 Ibid., 3. 
43 Ibid. 
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characteristics, participants, and programs that work together to fulfill the mission, but all 
centers operate under a consistent framework called the Fusion Center Baseline 
Capabilities.44 
The Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities were released by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security in 2008 and provide an operational blueprint for 
fusion centers to follow in an effort to standardize operations nationwide.45 The 
document describes and recommends a “baseline level of capabilities” for fusion center 
management to implement in the areas of planning and requirements development, 
information collection, intelligence analysis and dissemination, management and 
governance, security procedures, personnel and training, technology, and information 
privacy protections.46 . Department of Homeland Security determined that standardizing 
the basic functions of fusion centers would allow fusion centers to work together more 
efficiently and provide customers a standardized platform of service delivery regardless 
of the jurisdiction. It is a tribute to the fusion center community that the vast majority of 
the recognized state and regional fusion centers have met the minimum standards set 
forth in the baseline capabilities policy. U.S. Department of Homeland Security requires 
centers to report their progress on baseline and advanced functionality every year and 
grades each center on their performance. In addition, DHS provides technical workshops, 
live training, and special programs to assist fusion center management in reaching their 
goals of obtaining baseline capability certification. 
B. TYPES OF FUSION CENTERS 
Most fusion centers are hosted by a state or local law enforcement agency. The 
FBI also hosts a number of large regional fusion centers. Fusion centers are funded in a 
variety of ways: Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) federal grant funding, the State 
Homeland Security Grant, and direct federal or local funding. Regardless of the funding 
                                                 
44 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, United States Department of 
Homeland Security, and the United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, September 2008. 
45 Ibid., 1. 
46 Ibid., iii and chapter overviews. 
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source, most fusion centers operate in a similar fashion, with the scale of programs hosted 
by the center being the main difference. Generally, there are two main types of fusion 
centers—full-service fusion centers and intelligence clearinghouse centers.  
Full-service fusion centers47 usually have a full compliment of criminal 
intelligence analysts who provide tactical analytical case support and strategic analytical 
products, such as situational awareness bulletins, threat assessments, and officer safety 
alerts. Many of these centers, due to their size and large budgets, are also able to provide 
office space for nontraditional partners, such as firefighters, public health officials, 
private security personnel, and other federal, state and local law enforcement staff.  
In addition to analysts, full-service fusion centers have a full-time, collocated 
investigative capability within the center. For instance, the ACTIC has a FBI JTTF 
investigative team attached to the center that conducts counterterrorism investigations. 
The third component of most full-service centers is the presence of a robust 
Terrorism Liaison Officer Program. These programs, now called Fusion Liaison Officer 
Programs (FLO Programs), enlist a cadre of police officers, firefighters, and other first 
responders to provide an emergency response element that provides a live connection to 
major incidents and emergency command centers.  
The intelligence clearinghouse fusion centers48 often do not conduct criminal 
investigations directly from the center, but instead operate as a criminal intelligence 
support mechanism for other federal and local agencies. Many of these centers are similar 
to the pre-9/11 criminal intelligence units, but now offer assistance and support on 
counterterrorism efforts. 
Because these centers do not have an investigative component, most act as a 
regional clearinghouse for investigative tips, leads, and criminal intelligence. This service 
is usually in direct support of a regional FBI JTTF operation. Many intelligence 
                                                 
47 Arizona Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (ACTIC), NY State Fusion Center, and the Los 
Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). 
48 Oregon TITAN Fusion Center, Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center, Northern California 
Regional Intelligence Center. 
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clearinghouse centers host a criminal intelligence database and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to assist state and 
local law enforcement investigators and first responders communicate sensitive data 
between agencies. 
Similar to full-service centers, clearinghouse centers usually provide tactical and 
strategic analytical support, and many host Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Programs. 
C. FUSION CENTER SPECIAL PROGRAMS AND FEATURES 
Based on the mission and operational scope, many fusion centers provide special 
programs and services for their customers. The following is a synopsis of the most 
popular programs: 
Fusion Liaison Officer Programs, formally called Terrorism Liaison Officer 
Programs, are programs designed to facilitate the exchange of information between 
fusion centers and their customers.49  These customers can include other law enforcement 
officers and investigators, public sector organizations, such as departments of heath, fire 
departments, and Child Welfare Departments, and private sector individuals and 
businesses. 
Typically, fusion centers recruit and train individuals who have an interest in 
becoming a formal liaison between the fusion center and their agency. The majority of 
the participants are law enforcement officers, but many FLO programs include 
firefighters, corrections officers, National Guard Soldiers, and some include private 
citizens. Individuals usually participate on a part-time basis, but a few large fusion 
centers (Arizona ACTIC) have full-time members who are funded by federal grant 
programs. 
                                                 
49 Establishing a Fusion Liaison Officer Program, Development and Implementation Considerations, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Process Technical Assistance 
Program and Services, Washington, DC, August 2010, version 1.2. 
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The core mission of the FLO is to act as a liaison between the fusion center and 
the entity represented by the “officer.”  The role of the officer can take many forms, but 
the primary responsibility is to establish a formal information exchange between the two 
entities. This can be in the form of verbal briefings, electronic information exchange, or 
by formal published documents and briefings produced by the fusion center. The 
information can include terrorism and criminal activity indicators and threats, officer 
safety information and warnings, and basic security tips and procedures. The underlying 
theory for this exchange of information is that if first responders and the public are 
educated on how criminals and terrorists operate and accomplish their attacks, they can 
become “force multipliers” and report suspicious activity through their FLO or local law 
enforcement agency to help detect, deter and prevent crimes and specifically, terrorist 
threats.50 
One of the key responsibilities of the FLO is to deliver situational awareness 
training to their respective agency or organization.51  This training, in coordination with 
the fusion center, can be general or specific in nature depending on current threats and 
investigations. It is critical that first responders understand what terrorism is and what a 
terrorist must do to accomplish an attack. This can include information about the 
terrorism planning cycle, illegal fundraising, obtaining dangerous chemicals and 
explosive materials, and religious extremism indicators. This knowledge, combined with 
information and experience gained in the workplace, can mentally prepare first 
responders to see and recognize threats and indicators of terrorist activity. 
These training events can also be used as direct intelligence collection points. For 
instance, if the fusion center is assisting with a terrorism-related investigation, the FLO 
can brief the training recipients and ask them for specific information about suspects or  
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Process Technical Assistance 
Program and Services, Washington, DC, August 2010, version 1.2, 4. 
51 Ibid., 79. 
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related criminal activity in the area. This request for information can lead to tips and 
other valuable information that can be funneled directly to the fusion center for inclusion 
in the investigation. 
Some fusion centers deploy FLOs to major incident sites to act as the liaison 
between the command post and the fusion center. This direct link can provide both sides 
with valuable resources and services that are unavailable without an on-site participant. 
For instance, the FLO can request information and intelligence directly from the fusion 
center about known criminals, criminal activity, chemical storage locations, and building 
elements, and provide that to on-scene commanders. Conversely, the FLO can pass 
information to the fusion center regarding the incident that can be shared with other local 
agencies affected by the incident and even the federal government for situational 
awareness. Lastly, some FLO programs train their officers to have the ability to assist or 
conduct threat and vulnerability assessments on public and private buildings and 
structures.52   
1. Training Programs 
As highlighted by the fusion liaison officer programs, training and situational 
awareness is a primary function of many fusion centers. Most fusion centers regularly 
organize and host training seminars and conferences for first responders and intelligence 
professionals that focus on many topics associated with terrorism and crimes that support 
terrorism. For example, fusion centers have provided training on the subjects of: criminal 
intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, financial crimes that support 
terrorism, illegal charitable fundraising in support of terrorism, basic and advanced 
terrorism investigation techniques, criminal intelligence analysis, surveillance techniques, 
and many more. Many fusion centers rely on the federal government, the FBI, U.S. DHS, 
and the U.S. Justice Department to provide accessible, low-cost training for their staffs 
and customers. 
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Fusion Process Technical Assistance 
Program and Services, Washington, DC, August 2010, version 1.2, 78. 
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One of the key partners in providing this training is the United States Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (a department within the Department of Justice) that administers the 
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT). This program is specifically 
designed to provide cutting-edge training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
executives, command personnel, patrol officers, intelligence officers, investigators, 
analytical personnel, and prosecutors.53  State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training trainers 
are subject-matter experts and provide comprehensive training on the subjects mentioned 
above, and also host “train-the-trainer” programs to teach FLO program participants and 
first responders how to train others in terrorism-related topics. 
2. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Programs (CI/KR) 
The fusion center role in the protection of critical infrastructure has evolved over 
the past five years. Many fusion centers now take an active role in these programs, and 
often manage the programs and act as a partner to the federal government in 
electronically tracking these critical assets. 
The official definition of critical infrastructure is:  
An asset, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to a 
community and/or the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such assets, systems, or networks would have debilitating impacts on the 
community’s or the country’s security, continuity of government, 
continuity of operations, public health, public consciousness, or a 
combination of these effects.54  
An example of critical infrastructure is the western power grid, a military base, or 
a police station.  
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The official definition of a Key Resource is:  
A publicly or privately controlled resource essential to the minimal 
operations of the economy and government.55  
An example of a Key Resource is a local airport, a state college, or a bridge 
spanning a large river. 
Fusion centers have designed customized programs to assist their state’s Office of 
Emergency Management, or Office of Homeland Security, in providing a central 
repository of threat information, tactical and strategic analytical support, and the ability to 
conduct CI/KR vulnerability assessments.56 
Several fusion centers manage a team of individuals who work with public and 
private sector building and security professionals to conduct the full-spectrum 
vulnerability assessments. For example, the Colorado Rubicon Team, managed by the 
Colorado Information and Analysis Center, is comprised of Troopers from the Colorado 
State Police who identify and assess the state’s CI/KR assets.57 The team conducts on-site 
inspections to help identify vulnerabilities and recommend mitigation strategies to reduce 
potential loss of life, property damage, and economic damage caused by crime, natural 
disasters, and acts of terrorism.58 
One of the key features of a robust CI/KR program is the ability to store and 
retrieve data collected during the threat and vulnerability assessments. The Automated 
Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) program59 is a web-enabled database 
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59 Automated Critical Asset Management System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Washington, DC, Official Agency website: http://www.dhs.gov/automated-critical-asset-management-
system-acams, accessed 8/24/12. 
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system that provides agencies a set of tools to collect and use critical infrastructure data, 
assess a structure’s vulnerabilities, and develop incident response and recovery plans.60   
One of the key uses for the ACAMS system is in coordination with the FLO 
critical response programs described earlier. A first responder, trained by a fusion center 
in FLO operations, can respond to the scene of a disaster or incident and obtain web 
access to the ACAMS database. Once accessed, information stored in the database can 
help incident commanders make decisions about the integrity of the building, where 
dangerous chemicals might be stored, and even access floor plans and photographs of the 
building and surrounding structures. 
3. Suspicious Activity Reporting 
After the events of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies struggled to make the 
reporting of crime more efficient. In addition, officials came to realize that reporting 
crime, in and of itself, were not providing criminal intelligence analysts with enough 
information to produce valuable predictive intelligence products. Typical crime reports 
were facts, and witness accounts of criminal activity after the event, had actually 
occurred. What was needed was information and intelligence regarding criminal activity 
prior to the crime occurring. Law enforcement agencies desired a comprehensive national 
system to collect, store, and disseminate “suspicious activity, tips, and leads” that could 
be used to compare incidents and data from across local, state and federal jurisdictional 
boundaries, in an effort to proactively prevent crime. To answer this demand, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security developed the “If You See Something, Say 
Something” campaign.61  The working components of this program are twofold; a system  
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of databases and software used to collect and store data, and a public relations campaign 
to educate the public on the process of how to report suspicious activity to law 
enforcement. 
Fusion centers have taken an active role in this program and many host the 
computer servers and databases within their operations. The software package allows 
citizens to access the system via a web-portal, and enter suspicious activity directly into 
the program. Police dispatch personnel and intelligence center research analysts that 
receive tips and lead via the phone, email, or other social media systems, can also enter 
data directly into the system. Once the data has been entered, key fields in the database 
can be automatically linked with similar data that physically resides in other states and 
jurisdictions. When data matches preset criteria, officials in the effected state, DHS, and 
the FBI can be notified of potential matches at which time an analyst or agent can be 
assigned to research the information more thoroughly.  
This system is currently being established in most states, and it will take several 
years to understand and measure the program’s effectiveness and impact on criminal 
investigations. 
4. Special Events Support 
One of the operational advantages of a fusion center is the access employees have 
to valuable criminal justice information. For this reason, fusion centers have become 
valuable resources during special events and large-venue gatherings. 
Many fusion centers offer special events support by establishing an “information 
command post” at the event site, and provide a myriad of services to the host agencies. 
As an example, the Eugene Oregon Police Department was responsible for the security 
management of the 2012 United States Olympic Track and Field Trials, held at Heyward 
Field in Eugene, Oregon. The Oregon TITAN Fusion Center assisted Eugene PD by 
staffing their command post with four criminal intelligence analysts. These employees 
were able to access criminal intelligence databases, law enforcement database, electronic 
mapping systems, and Closed Caption Television Systems, to provide real-time 
information and support to agents and officers within the event site. 
 28 
In addition to on-scene assistance, fusion center analysts and staff can provide 
strategic intelligence products to event managers. These products can include threat 
assessments, comprehensive site maps, and if the state integrates a CI/KR program in 
their fusion center, they can provide insightful information about critical facilities in and 
around the event site. 
5. Watch Centers 
Many fusion centers host a “watch center” function. A watch center is usually a 
24/7 operation that provides critical information and research capability for investigators 
and first responders accessed via phone, email, or electronic communication system.  
Watch center staff, as mentioned above, has access to a myriad of criminal 
intelligence, law enforcement, and public information databases for the purpose of 
conducting in-depth research on a subject, organization, or illegal enterprise. One of the 
core functions of a criminal investigation is researching the background of all subjects 
involved in the case, including witnesses, known criminals, and other associates related 
to the suspects. Criminal investigators and first responders need to know if a subject has a 
violent history, has attacked or fled from police officers in the past, or has a history of 
dangerous drug use. Having this information in advance can enhance the investigator’s 
approach to interviewing the subject, allow the investigator to have additional assistance, 
if there is a safety concern, and allow law enforcement managers and prosecutors the 
ability to strategize a proper investigative approach the case. 
Watch centers also play an important role by providing investigators and first 
responders with a “deconfliction” tool or program. Deconfliction is a law enforcement 
technical term for “active tactical sharing” of time sensitive investigative operations. 
Most criminal intelligence databases today have both a “subject deconfliction” and an 
“operational deconfliction” function that allows investigators to enter a subject or an 
operation, and receive notification, if another agency has an operational interest in the 
case. For instance, if a detective is investigating a subject, he or she could call a watch 
center and have the analyst conduct a deconfliction search. If the query matches a 
previously entered subject, the analyst will notify the detective who originally entered the 
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subject, and introduce both detectives to one another. The goal of the program is to create 
an investigative partnership or network to allow a more efficient, comprehensive 
investigation to ensue.  
6. Equipment Loan Programs 
One of the most valuable services hosted by fusion centers are technical 
equipment loan programs. These programs pool valuable resources to purchase expensive 
surveillance and tracking equipment, and then loan the items out to agencies to assist in 
investigations and security operations. 
Most equipment loan programs purchase overt and covert video camera 
equipment, digital handheld video cameras, undercover body wires systems, electronic 
satellite tracking beacons, and Title III wiretap equipment and software. 
These items are often difficult to purchase for small agencies, and often take 
highly trained technicians to install and operate. The pooling of the equipment, and the 
centralization of the technical experts, saves enormous amounts of money for agencies 
that take advantage of the service. 
7. Products and Publications 
One of the core responsibilities of a fusion center is strongly worded in Fusion 
Center Baseline Capabilities, Section 1.E, where it states, “Fusion centers shall develop a 
high-level dissemination plan that documents the procedures and communication 
mechanisms for the timely dissemination of the center’s various products to the core and 
ad hoc customers.”62 
Producing intelligence products, such as threat assessments, criminal organization 
charts, criminal time-lines, and other strategic event warnings and bulletins is a core  
 
 
                                                 
62 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, United States Department of 
Homeland Security, and the United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, September 2008. 
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function of the criminal intelligence analyst. But, these products are only useful if they 
reach the intended customer for use in planning criminal investigations or creating a 
security strategy. 
Therefore, most fusion centers publish a number of products on a regular, and ad 
hoc basis. For instance, the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center publishes a weekly threat 
bulletin that is distributed to over one thousand first responders, investigations, and law 
enforcement executives statewide. The bulletin contains sections on terrorism-related 
events worldwide, officer safety information, gang-related information, investigative 
training opportunities, and a section on wanted subjects. 
In addition to the weekly bulletin, the center coordinates and distributes critical 
event and time-sensitive warning and event alerts in real time. If an amber alert occurs, or 
if a bank robbery is reported, the fusion center gathers all the pertinent information and 
creates a professionally designed bulletin and distributes it immediately to all 
participating agencies. Alerts can contain information about missing persons, crimes that 
have just occurred, critical officer safety and public safety information, and criminal 
threat information. 
8. The Role of the Criminal Intelligence Analyst 
As mentioned above, the central operating function of any fusion or intelligence 
center is the criminal intelligence analyst. This profession differs greatly from the better-
known function of a “crime analyst” whose sole function is to study crime and crime 
trends, and report that information to department decision makers. 
The criminal intelligence analyst is a highly trained research and coordination 
professional whose value has been rightly elevated since 9/11. The typical function of an 
analyst in a fusion center revolves around the intelligence collection process and the 
search for relationships between subjects, organizations, and criminal activity.63  Many 
analysts are assigned tactical case support to ongoing criminal investigations, and provide 
                                                 
63 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements, A Guide for Intelligence Professionals, The 
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and the Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Unit, Sacramento, CA, 2000, 60. 
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assistance in coordinating the case, and producing analytical charts consisting of illegal 
holdings and interests of known criminals, money laundering patterns, telephone toll 
analysis and the research of associates and other criminal organizations.64 
The need to disseminate valuable investigative and threat information is important 
in today’s criminal justice world because situational awareness and education of first 
responders and the public is important in helping law enforcement to identify and prevent 
terrorism. For this reason, the criminal intelligence analyst must be able to write 
effectively and publish their products in a professional, easy-to-understand format that 
can be examined and evaluated by law enforcement professionals and private citizens 
alike. 
Lastly, the criminal intelligence analyst must be able to communicate effectively, 
and play the role of central coordinator of all information coming into, and out of the 
fusion center. As we will highlight in Chapter IV, the ability to communicate and interact 
with all types of business and government officials is important to the success of fusion 
centers, and public and private partnership programs.  
D. FUSION CENTER COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES 
As mentioned in a previous section, fusion centers are uniquely designed to fit the 
mission and goals of the jurisdictions they serve. This holds true for how fusion centers 
communicate with nontraditional law enforcement partners such as private company 
representatives. Many fusion centers house civilian employees who represent private 
businesses and public agencies directly in the fusion center. For example, large fusion 
centers commonly accommodate fire fighters, public health professionals, corrections 
staff, private company security professionals, and other “nontraditional law enforcement 
partners” within the center. Unfortunately, some centers are unable to do so due to legal 
restrictions and the lack of space or funding, so they need to utilize electronic 
mechanisms to communicate with their partners.  
                                                 
64 Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements, A Guide for Intelligence Professionals, The 
International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and the Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Unit, Sacramento, CA, 2000, 60–61. 
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When these participants are located directly in the fusion center, all employees 
(including law enforcement agents and analysts) are typically vetted and must complete a 
formal background check by the host law enforcement agency. In some instances, many 
of these employees receive a clearance by either the FBI or DHS, equal in authority to an 
FBI Secret Clearance. 
Once the participant receives a clearance and is approved to operate within the 
center, that person can communicate and receive information and intelligence products in 
the same fashion as other sworn employees working in the center. But when 
circumstances arise that makes it difficult to house the employees directly in the center, 
management needs to find electronic mechanisms, or other more traditional methods, to 
exchange threat information and notify participants of important events.   
Fusion centers employ a combination of techniques and strategies to communicate 
nontraditional law enforcement partners, and other valuable participants by hosting 
regularly scheduled meetings and briefings, and by using an electronic collaboration 
system. Most fusion centers use one, or a combination of four electronic systems to 
communicate with private, public, and law enforcement employees working with the 
center. These systems are the Homeland Security Information System (HSIN)65, the FBI 
Infragard System66, RISS.net Intelligence Sharing Systems67, and custom-built fusion 
center websites. 
1. Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) 
The Homeland Security Information System is a United States Department of 
Homeland Security sponsored electronic collaboration system. Homeland Security  
 
                                                 
65 Homeland Security Information Network, United States Department of Homeland Security, 
Washington, DC, Agency website: http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network, accessed 
8–31–12. 
66 FBI Infragard System, United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC, Agency 
website: http://www.infragard.net/, accessed 8/31/12. 
67 Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), Murfreesboro TN, Agency website: 
http://www.riss.net/, accessed 8/31/12. 
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Information Network is accessed via the Internet by vetted law enforcement employees 
and private company representatives who are allowed access via fusion center or law 
enforcement agency sponsors. 
The HSIN “portal” is segmented into two main sections, a law enforcement-only 
section and a public portal. Even though the public portal title might suggest that all 
members of the public have access, this is not the case. Each state is granted a HSIN law 
enforcement administrator, usually a manager in a fusion center or intelligence unit. The 
administrator has the duel role of marketing the system to potential law enforcement and 
public customers, and issuing encrypted electronic tokens to vetted users. Law 
enforcement and public users are chosen carefully based on an operational need-to-know 
basis.  
The law enforcement membership access is simple, if you work in a fusion center 
or intelligence unit, or in a capacity needing terrorism or homeland security information, 
you can be granted access.  
The public access portal is managed more stringently. Public members are chosen 
based on a criteria outlined by fusion center management in consultation with HSIN 
policy representatives. Once public participants are selected, the HSIN administrator 
grants access by issuing a token and an electronic certificate that resides on the user’s 
computer. The user then logs onto the system by entering a user name and password 
stored and controlled by the HSIN administrator. Upon entering the HSIN site, the public 
user has access to FOUO (For Official Use Only) and Open Source documents posted by 
the HSIN administrator, fusion center staff, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
analysis staff. Law enforcement and criminal justice users have access to more sensitive 
documents in addition to the FOUO and Open Source Content. 
HSIN contains thousands of homeland security related documents, threat 
bulletins, training information, legal briefs and court decisions primarily focused on 
terrorism issues, but other related crimes and information are also contained within the 
site.  
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Aside from document sharing and training information, the HSIN site is designed 
to act as a collaboration tool. The site allows users to host meetings via an interactive 
message board that allows for live video conferencing and instant messaging. HSIN also 
has the capability to allow users to set up segregated work areas for special events that 
enable participants to exchange information, video, documents, and calendars specifically 
tailored for the event. So, if a user wanted to host a special site to organize and 
collaborate during a major event, the user could set up the site, invite law enforcement, 
public and private sector users, and use the site as an emergency operations 
communication tool with a minimum level of effort. 
Another example of an increasing popular way to use the HSIN public portal is 
provided by the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center. Oregon creates a separate portal for each 
U.S. DHS designated critical infrastructure sector and assigns access to vetted public 
participants directly into the sector matching their employment. The center then posts 
sector-specific information and publications on the portal and invites comments and 
additional documents and postings from the participants, creating a “community” 
approach to exchanging information within a sector.  
Based on the numerous features, and the functional design enabling a wide range 
of communication techniques, the HSIN system is becoming the most popular way for 
fusion centers and intelligence units to interact with the private sector and their wide 
variety of customers and partners.  
2. INfraGard 
The InfraGard program is a nonprofit organization, acting through the auspices of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to provide a mechanism for the private sector to 
interact with the FBI. The goal of the program is to encourage private businesses to 
exchange information with law enforcement through trusted partnerships and the use of 
the electronic collaboration provided by the FBI. 
The FBI, often partnering with state and local law enforcement agencies and 
fusion centers, coordinates the program through local field offices. Similar to the HSIN 
program, the FBI assigns a program coordinator, usually a FBI Special Agent, to oversee 
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and administer the program at the local FBI field office. Individual participants are vetted 
when they register through the electronic collaboration tool. The vetting occurs with FBI 
oversight, but this role is administered through an academic partnership with Louisiana 
State University, who provides staff to coordinate the registration process and conduct 
background checks on the public applicants.  
The local programs are custom designed to meet the needs of the customer base, 
but usually involve two central features: regularly scheduled training and information 
sharing meetings, and the use of the InfraGard electronic collaboration tool.  
Fusion Center Directors and program managers interviewed for this thesis 
indicate that regularly scheduled information sharing meetings are the bedrock of their 
programs. These meetings allow program participants to interact with the FBI agents 
from the local offices, state and local law enforcement officials, and to receive briefings 
and training provided by the program. The main goal of the training function is to give 
the private sector members the information and situational awareness they need to 
recognize a threat to their respective business enterprise. The program also recognizes 
that employees of a private business, and specifically security guards and investigators, 
are the best people to recognize suspicious behavior within their business. The program 
gives these specific individuals special training and information to build on that local 
experience and expertise, and to help them identify suspicious behaviors that would be of 
interest to the FBI to combat terrorism or other serious crimes. 
The InfraGard electronic reporting tool is designed differently than the HSIN tool, 
as its main function is to provide participants with a mechanism to report a perceived 
threat or suspicious activity to the FBI. Members can log into the system and fill out a 
specifically designed form to report any type of suspicious activity occurring within their 
business. This information is routed to a central collection center in Washington, DC, 
evaluated by an analyst or special agent, and then routed to a local FBI field office or 
JTTF investigation team for follow-up. If the information does not rise to the level 
needing immediate investigation, the information can be archived and compared against 
future tips and leads, which could form the basis for a formal investigation. 
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3. Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) 
The RISS system is a collection of regional criminal intelligence sharing 
programs, located in six distinct regions of the United States. Each program encompasses 
five to seven states, and hosts a centrally operated criminal intelligence database that 
connects to the other five databases through a center located in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. 
The overall program is funded by a grant administered by the United States 
Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance 
administers the grant and operates the technical aspects and database design functions in 
Murfreesboro. The program is different from other federal programs, as it provides 
funding to the individual regional systems that are then overseen by individual executive 
boards that hire and support a director responsible for the day-to-day operation of the 
regional program.  
As an example, the Western States Information Network (WSIN) is a RISS 
regional program located in Sacramento, California. The Western States Information 
Network regional partners include the states of Oregon, Washington, California, Hawaii, 
and Alaska. Each state participant is required to provide two executive board members, 
usually from the state police, and a large metropolitan police department respectively. 
The board meets regularly, oversees the performance of the appointed director, and 
approves budgets and operational programs.    
Each program is required to host a number of law enforcement investigative 
support programs, including the operation of a centralized criminal intelligence database 
that is electronically linked to the central hub in Murfreesboro. In addition to the 
database, the programs employ criminal intelligence analysts to provide case support to 
investigators in the field, provide research assistance on major investigations, and often 
provide a technical equipment loan program to its participants. 
The RISS network of programs provides a myriad of services to fusion centers, 
specifically in the form of intelligence sharing and operational deconfliction. Even 
though fusion centers are terrorism centric, the majority of the tips and leads that come  
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into a fusion center are of an “all-crimes” nature, and need to be shared with other law 
enforcement professionals so important connections between crimes and criminals can be 
exposed and investigated more efficiently.  
The RISS program primarily supports law enforcement partners, and generally 
allows access to the private sector. Regionally, the program attempted to provide portals 
for some private sector collaboration, but the HSIN system has taken over that role for 
the majority of fusion centers. 
One of the unique features provided by RISS is a system commonly referred to as 
“tactical deconfliction.” RISS hosts an electronic system called RISS-Safe, that allows 
investigators and fusion centers to share information about tactical operations in the field 
in an attempt to avoid conflicts with on-going operations by other agencies in the same 
geographic area. 
Investigators are encouraged, and now often mandated, to enter all tactical 
operations into the system. These operations include search warrant operations, SWAT 
operations, surveillances, vice operations, and “buy-bust” narcotics operations. The 
investigator enters the operation into the system and automatically creates a Geospatial 
Information System (GIS) map of the area where the event is taking place. The 
investigator then creates a “buffer zone” around the event that is coded into the map. The 
system stores this data, and if another tactical operation is entered into the system that 
falls within the selected buffer zone, the original investigator who entered the first tactical 
event is notified that a second tactical event is going to occur within his zone. Fusion 
center analysts are also electronically alerted to the “tactical conflict” by the system, and 
notify both investigators to help resolve the tactical conflict. 
This system creates two distinct operational advantages for fusion centers and 
investigators. First, the system helps avoid “cop vs. cop” situations where law 
enforcement investigators are not aware of a tactical operation occurring in their city. 
This improves officer safety, and can protect the accidental exposure of sensitive and 
often dangerous investigations. Secondly, the system acts as a secondary intelligence 
sharing mechanism as investigators can share investigative operational information 
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through the system, and if a conflict is discovered, investigators from both sides (each 
individual operation that were in conflict with one another) can meet and compare 
investigative data and tactical considerations. Both of these advantages lead to a safer, 
more efficient, and complete investigation and response, by law enforcement and fusion 
centers alike. 
4. Custom-Built Fusion Center Websites 
Many fusion centers, and law enforcement private sector outreach programs, are 
using custom-built websites and message boards to directly communicate with their 
partners and participants. 
These websites provide fusion centers the flexibility to provide publications and 
other material content and links to other services provided by host agencies and members. 
For instance, the Oregon TITAN Fusion Center hosts www.osin.info68. This website has 
a number of the same features as the HSIN system but also allows users to access custom 
features directly aimed at state and local users within the state of Oregon. One of these 
features is a web portal for all law enforcement training hosted in Oregon, and a custom 
tool allowing users to sign up and reserve seats in training classes. The site also allows 
access to legal documents, like the Oregon Search and Seizure Manual, and legal 
opinions posted by the Oregon Attorney General and the Oregon Court of Appeals.  
One of the most popular features of the osin.info site is the ability for a user to 
access NCIC directly from the site. This enables the user to conduct legal research, 
initiate wants and warrants checks on suspects, and obtain criminal history information 
on known suspects. The user can also access a list of links to common Oregon law 
enforcement research websites, such as the Oregon Employment Database, the Oregon 
Secretary of State’s Corporation Database, City and County Property Ownership 
databases, and the Oregon Fishing License Database.  
                                                 
68 Oregon Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Division, www.osin.info, accessed on 10/17/12. 
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One of the most professional public outreach websites in the nation is the Los 
Angeles InfraGard website.69  This website, cohosted by the Joint Regional Intelligence 
Center (JRIC) and the FBI, allows participants to communicate with the program 
management, report suspicious information directly to the fusion center, and view the 
National Terrorism Advisory System. 
The website has sections devoted to training announcements, threat warnings and 
publications, and the ability for citizens to join LA InfraGard directly from the site. One 
of the unique features is the site has a custom portal for each critical infrastructure sector. 
A member can click on a sector and receive an overview of the sector, what types of 
businesses are assigned to the sector, and links to contacts for threat information directly 
relating to individual businesses within the sector. In addition, the JRIC has an analyst 
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III. CASE STUDIES OF PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 
A. CASE STUDY NUMBER ONE, THE LOS ANGELES JOINT REGIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
The first case study is one of the largest terrorism fusion centers in the United 
States, the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, commonly called the L.A. 
JRIC. Specifically, this report examines JRIC’s private sector outreach program called 
InfraGard Los Angeles.  
Program manager, FBI Special Agent Regina Miles, was interviewed for this 
analysis on August 1, 2012, and the interview was tape recorded and transcribed. 
1. Background 
The program is one of the largest law enforcement private sector outreach 
programs operated in the United States. Currently, the program provides services to 2,230 
participants in seven large counties in Southern California, including Los Angeles, 
Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Ventura and Santa Barbara. 
Originally established in 1996, the main focus of the program is to provide a 
collaboration platform that allows the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to 
exchange information with the private sector with the goal of keeping their businesses 
secure and their employees safe. In return, the FBI anticipates that the participants will 
share information with the FBI that might alert the agency to suspicious activity or threats 
that could help them prevent a terrorist attack.  
The program is operated out of Joint Regional Intelligence Center but is overseen 
and managed by the Los Angeles FBI Field Office. The current program manager, 
Regina Miles, is supervised by a Supervisory Special Agent on the FBI’s Liaison Squad 
within the SHIELD Intelligence Group. Because the program resides within the fusion 
center, Miles informally reports to managers employed by the Los Angeles Police 
Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. 
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The InfraGard Los Angeles program also employs a civilian oversight committee 
comprised of four executive members and seven board members. These members are 
nominated by program participants and serve as advisors to the program manager. The 
committee also helps the program manager handle controversies or complaints that might 
arise with participants and makes program related recommendations to the FBI.  
Miles stated that the program has changed dramatically over its history, making 
programmatic shifts in 2003 and 2004 when she was assigned as the program manager. 
Prior to 2003, the program was primarily a resource for the public to report crimes and 
tips, with an emphasis on terrorism activity. The national program managers determined 
the program should be more robust and allowed local program managers to institute 
customized changes to meet the demands of their local businesses. 
Nationally, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure was a high priority, and 
Miles saw the InfraGard program as the perfect tool to connect with private businesses to 
help keep them safe. In addition, she saw the potential participants as “force multipliers” 
and the real “eyes and ears” that actually know what is, and is not, suspicious activity 
within their businesses.  
It was during this early phase of the program’s development that Miles heard 
about the Los Angeles Police Department’s Archangel program. This program was 
designed to assist private companies, specifically identified as a critical infrastructure, 
evaluate their facilities and provide them with strategies to harden them against a terrorist 
attack and improve overall security. Miles began accompanying the LAPD Archangel 
officers to learn about the intricacies of this effort, with the goal of integrating their 
methods and strategies into the InfraGard LA program. Coincidentally, during that same 
time frame, Miles attended a meeting where the Director of the FBI was giving a speech 
about counterterrorism efforts within the agency. One of his key points in the speech was 
that the FBI needed to improve their relationship with the public in regards to critical 
infrastructure and “share, share, share!”  Miles said jokingly, “Holy crap, he’s talking to 
me!” 
 43 
She used this inspiration to integrate the Archangel critical infrastructure 
protection strategies into the InfraGard Los Angeles program and establish the main goal 
of educating private businesses about real-time threats and preventative measures to 
protect their businesses.  
Miles crafted her strategy with the idea that if the FBI and the fusion center 
provided high-quality publications to the private partners, including real-time threat 
information and realistic approaches to protect their businesses, the program would grow 
and so would the participant’s trust in law enforcement. The tool they used to disseminate 
these publications was the InfraGard electronic collaboration portal.  
The InfraGard portal is a website managed by the FBI with the assistance of 
Louisiana State University. Members gain access to the site by filling out a registration 
form, which allows the FBI to conduct a routine background check of the applicant. Once 
vetted, members can access the site, read publications produced by the FBI and fusion 
centers, report threats, tips, and leads directly to the FBI, and access training materials for 
their businesses.  
Miles said she really did not have a formal marketing strategy to attract new 
participants. Her technique was simple, meet the participants in person, and GO to their 
meetings!  Miles said one of the elements of the program is to encourage the participants 
to meet on a regular basis to share information and to engage in training. Miles and her 
colleagues will often provide training on a myriad of criminal justice topics, usually 
centered on the prevention of terrorism, and encourage the participants to exchange ideas 
and strategies that have worked for them. Other than the meetings, Miles stated that their 
website has been an important factor in recruiting new members and so has “word of 
mouth.”  Miles contends that if her members find the program useful and beneficial to 
their business, they will spread the word to other business associates. 
2. Critical Errors in Planning or Operations 
Miles immediately responded to the topic of critical errors they made by recalling 
that she accidentally disseminated sensitive information by mistake. She said she has 
only done this once in eight years of managing the program, but it was an important 
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learning experience for her. It taught her the program’s credibility was the most important 
feature, and that if you are not careful with privacy issues, or the sensitive nature of 
intelligence operations, the programs can fail due to poor reputation alone. Understanding 
that security of information is paramount has helped Miles improve her operation and 
focused her and her coworkers to take this topic seriously and remain vigilant to this 
issue. 
3. Obstacles to Success 
When asked about what obstacles affected the operation or success of the 
program, Miles said her coworkers did not understand or see the value of the program. 
Miles said her fellow FBI agents did not take the program seriously and did not 
understand the value to the community or the Bureau.  
Miles was determined to succeed and felt she needed to build trust over time and 
prove the program could accomplish its goals and mission. She said, “…nobody knows 
what the program is until it grows and gets a reputation!”  She said a strong program 
name is very important, so people can link the name to the services being rendered. Once 
people automatically recognize the name and attach the name to the program’s credibility 
and important services, the program will grow and become popular with other agents and 
managers. Miles said it took a number of years, but she kept pushing allowed the success 
of the program to speak for itself. Now, other FBI agents understand the program’s value 
and often volunteer to help give training or participate in other ways. 
4. Key Program Components and Smart Practices 
Miles identified a number of key features that are significant to the overall 
success of the InfraGard Los Angeles program. They are: 
1. Program managers need to understand their partners and make a concerted 
effort to learn the business landscape in their area. Talking to business 
leaders, security professionals, and technology specialists is difficult if 
you do not understand their unique jargon and concerns. The only way to 
learn about the business environment is to get out and talk to people. 
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2. The program should only specialize in one main service. If the program 
has too many features or services, you lose expertise and need additional 
staff to handle it. For instance, Miles focuses only on outreach and 
education, and does not try to recruit her members as informants or 
intelligence sources. She believes that if members think she is always 
trying to obtain information from them, they will lose trust and not 
participate. She leaves the intelligence gathering business to her FBI and 
fusion center colleagues. 
3. Program managers and law enforcement participants need to show up to 
meetings and events as a team. Participants must see a team effort and 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies to build trust. 
4. Understand the premise that law enforcement does not know everything 
and has a lot to learn from the private sector. Miles said a critical mistake 
is to go into a business and pretend to know what they do and what the 
threats are. “Don’t be afraid to learn. It’s good!” 
5. Make sure to establish and keep and engaged policy board or oversight 
committee. The members must take an active role in the operation and be 
“true believers” in the cause. Members who are there for personal 
enrichment must be removed, as it is often obvious to members and 
creates a poor example. 
6. Program management must keep the participants engaged and constantly 
sharing or the program will falter. They must feel they are part of the 
system, have a trusting relationship with other members and the 
sponsoring agency members, or you will lose them. 
7. Establish a nonprofit or other mechanism to generate private funding for 
the program. Nationally, politicians and civic leaders do not yet 
understand the value of these programs and are reluctant to provide the 
appropriate funding. Private donations, fund raising events, and user fees 
are examples of ways to raise money to purchase supplies, pay for training 
venues, and buy needed equipment. 
8. Social media and websites are important in today’s technological world. If 
you do not have a website or some type of alternative media position, you 
will lose out on potential participants. websites are the easiest way to 
reach people with a minimal amount of staff. The content on the sites can 




9. If possible, send your publications and bulletins directly to the user. Do 
not just post them on a site and force them to log-on to get them. People 
are too busy and want the convenience of receiving publications by email. 
10. Provide valuable tools to participants that they can put to use immediately. 
For instance, the InfraGard LA team produced a model emergency 
operations plan that businesses can customize with very little effort. These 
types of tools are great for the business and they achieve immediate 
results. 
11. The InfraGard LA program created an Infrastructure Liaison Officer 
program, similar to the LAPD Archangel program. This group works in 
concert with the Infragard members and provides vulnerability 
assessments for businesses who participate in the program 
12. Lastly, you must be all-inclusive. Every business should be able to 
participate. Miles said that “mom and pop” stores are often very familiar 
with neighborhood problems and criminal activity, but are often 
overlooked by law enforcement outreach programs. The common practice 
is to focus on the biggest employer in the region, and even though that is 
very important, strategic businesses in areas not traditionally targeted for 
these programs might be more beneficial partners. This strategy coincides 
strongly with the first key feature. Knowing the businesses in your 
geographic jurisdiction, and the value they might bring to the program is 
critical.  
B. CASE STUDY NUMBER TWO, THE COLORADO INFORMATION 
ANALYSIS CENTER  
The second case study is another large private sector outreach program operated 
by a state-sponsored fusion center, the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC). 
Specifically, this analysis examines CIAC’s critical infrastructure protection outreach 
program called RUBICON. 
Program manager Lieutenant Colonel Brenda Leffler was interviewed for this 
report on July 13, 2012, and then again on July 31 for a series of follow-up questions. 
The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. 
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1. Background 
Colonel Leffler began the interview by giving an overview of the history of the 
fusion center itself, as she felt the operational changes in the management of the fusion 
center would help explain how the RUBICON program was established. 
The CIAC serves as the state fusion center and serves approximately 4,000 law 
enforcement and criminal justice professional customers across the state of Colorado. The 
CIAC is staffed by 30 employees from a multitude of local, state and federal agencies and 
is the central point for inter-agency information gathering and is responsible for review, 
analysis and dissemination of this information. The center acts as a formal liaison 
between the assigned agencies, to combat major criminal threats and improve the sharing 
of counterterrorism information.  
The center’s other role involves private industry, as it now provides threat 
warning information to businesses to ensure safety and security.  
Lastly, the fusion center has the important role as acting as a “terrorism early 
warning system” for the Governor’s office and the state’s elected officials. 
The original CIAC was established in 2002, but it went through a painful 
reorganization and restructuring in 2004 and 2005 after an audit was conducted on U.S. 
Homeland Security Grant funds from the 2002 grant allocations. Leffler said the results 
were “absolutely embarrassing to the state” and the governor stepped in and replaced 
every member of the staff who had originally started the program. The program was 
turned over to the Colorado State Patrol, which was followed by several years of 
attempting to repair the center’s credibility and damaged relationships. 
One of the significant changes that resulted from the reorganization, bolstered by 
the theory that the agency had to repair partnerships with the private sector, was the 
establishment of the RUBICON program. 
Leffler describes the program as a hybrid: a combination of a traditional terrorism 
liaison officer program and a critical infrastructure outreach program. The official 
mission of the RUBICON team is to work with private industry and public agencies to 
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conduct “full-spectrum vulnerability assessments” on critical infrastructure and key state 
assets. The team conducts the assessments and provides the business owners and 
management with a threat mitigation plan they can use to strengthen security and harden 
the physical buildings to an attack. The team also collects a plethora of technical data 
about each facility and enters it into the Automated Critical Asset Management System 
(ACAMS), which is a web-enabled portal managed by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security to store and track critical infrastructure across the nation. 
When asked how the team was initially designed, Leffler laughed and said, “We 
made it up as we went along!” She said the original group that was responsible for the 
assessments was the Colorado National Guard. The team was already conducting studies 
and assessments on large-scale, high-visibility targets like movie theaters, stadiums and 
shopping malls. Leffler’s group met with the National Guard employees and modeled the 
RUBICON program to mimic what they were doing. Leffler sent Colorado State 
Troopers to specialized training, a two-week infrastructure assessment school, and the 
National Guard team mentored the troopers for a couple of months to get them started. 
Once the program goals were established, the Colorado State Patrol decided that a 
dedicated five state troopers could do the assessments full-time, with the oversight 
provided by one assigned Sergeant as the team’s supervisor. The entire program would be 
overseen by the traditional chain of command, with additional oversight and direction 
from the fusion center management team, including Leffler. The program does not have a 
separate oversight board or committee.  
The team operates on a very small budget, approximately $350,000 per year for 
personnel costs, and an equipment and supplies budget of approximately $25,000. The 
rest of the hidden costs (vehicles, standard police equipment, and training) are absorbed 
in the State Patrol baseline budget. 
The program can also draw funds from a unique program sponsored by a local 
nonprofit in Denver called the Center for Empowered Living and Learning, CELL. The 
program developed a community education program that they deliver to members, and  
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the RUBICON team members actually teach. The program is mobile and is presented in 
schools and other civic venues, and it focuses on terrorism prevention, resiliency, and 
home and business security awareness. 
In addition to the actual assessments, the program provides continuing support to 
their customers in the form of publications and training. The small contingent of 
RUBICON team members partner with the fusion center’s fusion liaison officer program 
to provide this information. When RUBICON learns of new techniques or specialized 
threats that might target a specific type of infrastructure, (e.g., the power grid) they 
produce a white paper and distribute it using the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN) or the InfraGard program. 
The team communicates with the over six hundred FLO participants, and 
countless community members via a custom-designed list serve program. The team sends 
reports on training opportunities, terrorism trends, national crime reports, protective 
measures and best practices, and direct threat information, to participants via the list 
serve. This direct communication keeps participants engaged and aware of all program 
activities. 
Leffler said the RUBICON program does not employ a formal marketing 
program, but it maintains the philosophy that if you show up, people with listen. Leffler 
said they attempt to attend any meeting or public event where people are talking about 
crime, terrorism, or security. One of their main goals is to try to participate in every event 
by providing some type of training as often as possible. 
2. Critical Errors in Planning or Operations 
Leffler stated she believed the management team made two key errors when 
establishing and operating the program.  
The first was they did not have a plan to sustain operations. They gave zero, or 
very little thought to how the daily operation of the program could last, how it would be 
funded five years in the future, or if the “powers to be” would think the program was 
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valuable and wanted it to continue. They knew federal funding was currently available, 
but did not foresee the massive government shortfalls and the shrinking grant allocations. 
Secondly, and more important, was the team did not reach out to local law 
enforcement as a partner. Leffler explained that when the program first started, private 
companies were very concerned about the security of their information and specifically, 
proprietary information. They did not want local law enforcement to be involved in the 
“out-briefings” because they were afraid the information would be documented and 
disclosed in law enforcement reports that were available to the public. The RUBICON 
team listened, and kept local law enforcement out. 
Leffler said this completely alienated local law enforcement agencies where the 
private businesses were located. The local cops did not get to learn what the 
vulnerabilities of the businesses were, and they were unable to make suggestions to 
mitigate threats based on local knowledge and expertise. So, in trying to protect the 
business owners, Leffler said, “…we paid hell for that for a couple of years.”  
Relationships were damaged and local police chiefs and sheriffs thought they were trying 
to intrude into local responsibilities and business relationships.  
Once RUBICON managers realized what was happening, they changed course 
and reached out to the locals for ideas and assistance. The new policy of the RUBICON 
team is that they do not do the assessments unless the business agrees to allow local law 
enforcement and fire representatives to be part of the out-briefing. 
3. Key Program Components and Smart Practices 
When questioned about key components and strategies that have led to the 
success of the RUBICON program, Leffler listed the following tips and suggestions: 
1. Program leaders need to set aside the egos and work to establish 
partnerships with the private sector. Leffler said, “We thought, because we 
were troopers, we can do anything and get it done by ourselves just by 
hard work. We completely undervalued what everyone else could bring to 
the programs and the processes that we were trying to develop.”   
One of the key strategies is to put in the effort to understand the role of the 
business in the community and get a firm grasp on what the business does 
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everyday and how it impacts the city and state. This will allow you to have 
meaningful conversations with business leaders, and they will see you 
have done your homework and understand their value. 
2. Build and maintain a high level of credibility. Leffler felt this was the 
most important aspect of her job. Being honest, transparent, 
straightforward and trustworthy buys a tremendous a tremendous amount 
of credibility currency. 
3. Never promise more than you can deliver. When you start a new program, 
and participants start to interact with your team and a level of trust is 
established, the participants will naturally ask for more services and 
products. The team’s natural inclination would be to step outside of the 
stated mission and try to help. Try to avoid this as the everyday stress on a 
program involves delivering the main product, in this case complex 
security assessments. If dabbling in a side project reduces the main 
deliverable, your reputation for high quality of work will diminish. 
4. Create an emergency access list of subject-matter experts in all fields 
within your jurisdiction that can be contacted 24/7 during an emergency or 
crisis. Understand that business leaders usually want to help, and when 
they finally do receive that emergency call, they will tell everyone they 
know that the government reached out and asked for help. Dedication to 
the program is a two-way street. 
5. Follow-up after a service is delivered. The policy of the RUBICON 
program is after an assessment is done, someone from the team follows up 
with the business to see if they implemented any of the protective 
measures that they asked them to try. This sends a message that you care, 
but also allows the business to share critical feedback on what mitigation 
techniques work, and which ones do not. Management needs to review the 
feedback in an effort to make improvements in the program as it matures. 
6. Attempt to work with existing business groups or associations. Downtown 
business groups, for example, are always trying to keep involved in civic 
issues, and crime and crime prevention are always important. If you can 
tap into an existing group, not only will you identify potential business 
customers, but also address security issues across a broad spectrum of 
businesses all in one place. Conversely, many of these groups are 
established based solely on the business category, for instance a 
technology business group. These sector-specific groups allow team 
members to feel the pulse of a particular sector and get a wide variety of 
expert opinions in one specific area. 
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7. Program team members must participate in public forums, InfraGard 
chapter meetings, etc. Not just program managers or agency heads. 
Program participants want to hear from the real experts, not the managers. 
8. The program must have complete political support from agency 
management and city or state leadership. In Colorado, from the Governor 
down, the message is, “this program is very important, our businesses and 
their security is very important, and you will not fail to provide this 
valuable service!” 
That being said, all levels of agency and government management must 
have a complete understanding of the program, how it works, which 
businesses are targeted and why. This is key as the public will ask 
government leaders about the program, and if the official supports the 
program. If business leaders feel political leadership or agency executives 
do not understand or hold the program in high regards, they will not play. 
9. If you are starting a new program, invest in a professionally designed 
project management program. There are low-cost software products 
available to help managers project costs, track tasks and goals, and set 
design milestones. Many of these programs include GANT charts to help 
participants visually see the project components and timelines. These 
programs also allow you to review your progress, and when you are done, 
go back and debrief the design plan to help improve the plan for the next 
big project. 
10. Lastly, you need to consider how your new project will affect other 
programs and operations inside your agency. When a new project is being 
implemented, everyone’s eyes are on it, and the agency is expending 
resources and manpower to get it established. But, in reality, funds and 
manpower are being diverted to the new program from an existing 
program or service. Leffler said, “You know outreach, you think you 
understand the politics and legislation and funding, but do you know the 
cascading effects of making this decision and how it affects X, Y and Z 
decisions?  If you are going to do this, you should be at least considering 
these things as well!” 
C. CASE STUDY NUMBER THREE, THE ORANGE COUNTY SHIELD 
PROGRAM  
The third case examines a private sector outreach program operated by a local 
fusion center, the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (OCIAC). The program 
operated by the center is the nationally known Orange County SHIELD program.  
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Program manager, Heather Houston, was interviewed for this report on July 13, 
2012, and then on several other occasions for follow-up questions. The interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed. 
1. Background 
The Orange County SHIELD Program (referred to as SHIELD from this point 
forward) was originally established in 2002, but as the other two programs examined in 
this thesis went though a name change in 2007, it was transferred to the newly formed 
Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center to manage. The program was formally 
called the Private Sector Terrorism Response Group, and originally fell under the 
management of the Orange County Terrorism Early Warning Group (which was later 
renamed as the Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center.  
The program’s mission is to reach out to private sector security directors in the 
Orange County Metropolitan area and bring these important assets into the homeland 
security discussions, exercises, and training to increase awareness of crime trends and 
provide them with crime prevention strategies.  
The current manager of the program is Heather Houston, who was appointed to 
oversee the program in 2001 by the Orange County Sheriff. Houston said the Sheriff 
travelled to New York and was impressed by the private sector response to the attack on 
the Twin Towers. Houston’s research led her to understand how important the private 
sector can be in the aftermath of a catastrophic event the size and scope of the September 
11 attacks. Moreover, she saw how her own community came together and responded in 
the aftermath of enormous wild fires. Houston said, “I saw the corporate folks bring 
truckloads of resources to the affected areas. The goal is to work with private sectors 
partners and begin a collaborative relationship before a crisis presents itself” 
Houston took the lead of establishing the new program, and felt her twenty-year 
background with Bank of America helped prepare her for the challenges of 
communicating with the business community. Houston is a civilian employee and reports 
through the Orange County Sheriff’s Department chain-of-command. 
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Her research led her to the origins of the NYPD Shield program, as well as, 
successful private outreach programs in Great Britain called Project’s Griffin and 
ARGUS. Both of these programs incorporate the public and private business into the 
framework of the county’s terrorism prevention and response strategy. The local police in 
England train citizens and host exercises to prepare them for mass casualty events, 
natural catastrophes, evacuations, and major public health emergencies. 
Houston said she had to break through strong cultural traditions in terms of 
allowing private sector employees into security and homeland security discussions, which 
did not happen before the program was established. She stated there was a very strong 
“us versus them” culture and tradition in the law enforcement community that she 
desperately needed to change. “And I would say the hardest thing I had to do was to work 
to break that wall so that law enforcement saw private sector security as a force multiplier 
and a partner in our homeland security efforts.”  Houston reports that the majority of 
SHIELD members are security directors, business continuity officers, business 
resumption professionals, and health and safety officers. She said the membership is very 
diverse, representing business and industry, academia, and of course, shopping/resort 
properties (Disneyland!). 
Houston took a unique approach when first deciding whom to recruit to join the 
program. She asked herself, “Okay, what do I want to build and who is going to play?  
We have Anaheim as our resort center, Irvine is our business center, and Santa Ana is our 
government seat. We are very deep in targets here and generate a GNP of approx. $200 
billion dollars. So there are two threats: threats against assets, and threats against our 
population density. So, when I look at the county, I think anyone should be allowed in. 
Unless there’s a reason for me not to do business with somebody, I don’t have a problem 
with everybody doing business in Orange County being part of Shield!” 
The SHIELD program’s primary function is education, and they accomplish this 
in two ways. The first is by producing and disseminating a weekly briefing report, called 
appropriately, “The SHIELD.”  The bulletin is produced by Houston and analysts from 
the fusion center and contains national threat briefings and alerts, local and regional 
crime trends, crime prevention tips, and updated alerts about training opportunities for 
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members. The SHIELD is emailed to the over 850 members every Friday, and acts as an 
education tool and marketing service all in one product. 
The second part of the program is the membership and training meetings held 
every other month. Each meeting has an overall training theme, chosen by fusion center 
staff or by actual program participants. The fusion center analysis group will usually 
conduct a briefing on threats and tips and leads that have come into the center since the 
last meeting. They will discuss current trends and participate in a round-table 
conversation about the topics. In addition to the formal meetings, the program hosts four 
additional meeting jointly with the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program participants 
who are primarily police officers and firefighters. These joint meetings are very valuable 
as the TLO’s can share trends and issues that are currently being discussed in law 
enforcement agencies.  
The SHIELD program is one of the few programs in the country that does not use 
an electronic collaboration tool like InfraGard or HSIN. Houston said she encourages 
members to join the InfraGard Los Angeles program and get access to HSIN but feels 
managing a system is not wise due to the lack of funding and additional personnel to 
oversee a system of that size. Additionally, Houston does not vet program participants. 
Again, this is not the traditional approach, however, she believes vetting is difficult, 
expensive and a manpower draw on a program. She explains that the bulletins do not 
contain national security information and are primarily open source or For Official Use 
Only (FOUO) and do not need a security clearance or background to access. 
Houston said the program has a very small budget and is now managed directly 
by the fusion center. She said the budget only pays her salary, and federal grant funds pay 
for training as long as TLOs are in the meeting as well. All other SHIELD meetings are 
hosted by the Orange County Sheriff’s Department at no cost to the participant. 
Houston does not employ a formal marketing strategy, but she produces and 
disseminates a tri-fold brochure describing the program whenever she is at a public event. 
She also knows the TLOs do a tremendous amount of marketing, as they interact with the 
public and often recommend private sector professionals to join SHIELD. 
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2. Critical Errors in Planning or Operations 
Houston said the program’s biggest mistake in planning was the initial strategy of 
primarily targeting only the biggest businesses in the county. She said the program 
(before she took over) was viewed as an “exclusive club.”  They did not recruit smaller 
businesses or mom- and pop-type companies that are in a position to have first hand 
information on local threats and crime issues. 
3. Obstacles to Success 
Houston viewed the law enforcement culture as the largest obstacle to the 
program. She said, “Law enforcement historically viewed private sector security as 
untrusted, undertrained and ineffective. So, the way they viewed private sector security 
was not only grossly inaccurate, but it was dangerously unfair. So my biggest battle was 
on my home front. This is a different world, and I don’t want to be someone who’s sitting 
on information and doesn’t share it with stakeholders when IT hits the fan. I don’t want 
to be that guy!” 
She went on to say it is primarily the more senior (time, not age) officers that do 
not think the public should be a part of the police world. She said this is almost 
impossible to overcome, especially for a civilian woman in law enforcement. 
4. Key Program Components and Smart Practices 
Houston listed a number of key components and smart practices she believed 
were the bedrock of the SHIELD program. They are: 
1. You must keep participants constantly engaged or you will lose them. Her 
best strategy for that is the weekly SHIELD bulletin. 
2. Provide free training as often as possible. The private sector’s main goal is 
to make money, and outside training opportunities are rarely provided. 
People generally are hungry for cutting-edge information, and feel 




3. Allow participants to have input into the training agenda. ASK THEM 
what THEY need to learn. Don’t always assume your best topic is the one 
they want or need. Customize the training to the group, do not cookie-
cutter the training. 
4. Combine resources, especially other law enforcement groups like TLO’s 
or other first responders. If you allow these groups to mingle with the 
private sector, magic will happen.  
5. Only operate the program as a liaison program only, as a buffer between 
the public and law enforcement. The program should not be seen as a 
crime-fighting, counterterrorism unit- the primary mission is information 
sharing, networking and education. This training/outreach role always 
makes the public more comfortable and elicits more participation and 
engagement. 
6. Do not be selective of the program participants. The guy who owns the gas 
station is probably the guy with the best view of the world. Do not leave 
him out. 
7. Do not turn down anyone who wants to join unless there are security 
issues or concerns with a person’s motivation to join. Vendors are the 
exception; they are not invited to join to market products or services. 
8. Do not conduct background checks on the participants. It is costly (often a 
very high hidden cost) and is not functionally effective. A very cursory 
background check can give you a false sense of security. You rarely get 
people who do not have good intentions trying to join these programs. We 
deal in open source information. 
9. Pick a civilian as the director! Houston thinks participants are quicker to 
accept a civilian in public/law enforcement partnership role. 
10. Learn who your audience is!  Work hard to create an open communication 
environment that builds trust. This will increase information flow and is 
the bedrock of any successful program. 
11. The most important function is to act in support of the local law 
enforcement agency! Do not alienate the locals by coming in and 
presenting yourself as the all-knowing expert on security issues.  
So when I go out to a private sector asset, I am extremely clear that I’m 
not a bigger law enforcement presence than their locals, that I’m operating 
absolutely as a support to their locals and I encourage them to meet them. 
You know, bring in their law enforcement, bring their fire department, 
bring in their county health officials so that they become familiar with 
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their asset, they become familiar with their management team, let the 
SWAT players train in there at night at their facility.  
D. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
From the outside looking in, the three programs appear to be similar. They all 
have exceptional reputations within the law enforcement community and are meeting the 
goals set forth by their leadership and Department of Homeland Security standards and 
milestones. But when you examine the programs more carefully, all three have many 
characteristics in common, but achieve their missions in different ways. 
One of the most intriguing aspects that emerged from the case studies was that 
two of the programs made drastic changes in their operations after several years of 
mediocre performance. The LA JRIC program changed in 2003 and 2004 to include 
critical infrastructure issues and increase participation of businesses and the public. The 
RUBICON program’s change was forced from the outside as a government audit 
revealed poor performance. The reorganization lead to the establishment of the critical 
infrastructure analysis program and the partnership created with Colorado’s Fusion 
Liaison Officer Program. And although Heather Houston from the Orange County 
SHIELD program did not focus heavily on the issue of operational change during her 
interview, when she took over the program in 2007 the program was completely changed 
from a small operation within the Private Sector Terrorism Response Group to an 
independent private sector outreach group with its own leadership and mission.  
All three of the program managers were innovative in their approaches in custom 
designing their programs to meet the needs of their local constituents. Regina Miles and 
Heather Houston both found programs that had components they wanted to emulate, and 
customized them to fit their demands. Miles came into contact with the LAPD Archangel 
program and incorporated ideas they developed to analyze critical infrastructure and 
involving local businesses in their threat assessments. Houston was able to merge the 
most successful qualities of three regional programs, the New York SHEILD program 
and Britain’s Griffin and ARGUS projects.  
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Brenda Leffler said their approach was to “make it up as they went along.”  Even 
though she was being modest in her response, when you examine the efforts she took to 
research the existing Colorado National Guard infrastructure program and the national 
training she identified to educate her employees, these actions are the foundation to 
designing a successful program. Taking successful attributes of existing programs, while 
simultaneously using strategies that are already working, (and eliminating functions that 
do not work), seems to be a recipe for success in law enforcement programs.  
Another surprising element that emerged from the interviews was the importance 
placed on the issue of understanding your program partners. The three managers all 
insisted that law enforcement continues to do a poor job of learning from, and integrating 
the knowledge of the private sector into their operations. Leffler stated, “We completely 
undervalued what everyone else could bring to the programs and the processes that we 
were trying to develop.”  
Leffler summarized this topic by identifying and comprehending what the private 
sector does allows us to get a firm grasp on what a company does, and how it might 
impact the day to day operation of the city and the state. This knowledge, coupled with 
the understanding of the existing terrorism and criminal threat, empowers law 
enforcement to make meaningful recommendations to business leaders about how to 
protect their businesses and employees. 
Funding was also an important topic during the interviews, and it is noteworthy 
that the three programs operate on a very small yearly budget. This being said, the 
addition of supplemental funds by innovative fundraising allowed two of the programs to 
continue to operate even though operational funding was limited.  
The RUBICON program is not a “nonprofit” but established a valuable 
partnership with community training and education program called the Center for 
Empowered Living and Learning, CELL. RUBICON is allowed to accept private funds 
from CELL, in exchange for specialized training and programs presented on behalf of 
CELL at quarterly meetings. The LA JRIC partners with Louisiana State University to  
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save money on the cost of vetting participants and also takes donations directly from 
program members to pay for training venues and meeting essentials like basic supplies 
and break snacks.  
These small but effective fundraising efforts go a long way to making a program 
successful. When federal grant funds and local law enforcement budgets are crafted to 
fund special programs, little consideration is given to small administrative functions that 
often make the difference between failure and success. The cost of conducting 
background checks on program participants could be extremely cost prohibitive, but the 
extra effort displayed by Regina Miles and her team to take full advantage of an 
academic resource to improve the value and productivity of their program makes all the 
difference. 
Relating to the funding issues discussed during the case studies, the issue of 
program sustainability was an important topic for the locally managed programs. The 
SHIELD program and the RUBICON team program manager both emphasized the 
importance of planning ahead with a focus on long-term funding. Leffler said they gave 
“zero” thought to how the daily operation of the program could last, or how it would be 
funded five years in the future. She hoped the department executives would see the value 
of the program and just pay for it. Both managers thought federal funding would continue 
to pay for the program and never saw the impending impact of the massive government 
shortfalls and shrinking grant allocations.  
Strategic planning plays a critical role in program development, but very little 
thought is given to the impact of sustaining the funding. Law enforcement agencies fall 
into the same traps as state and local governments do; they use current tax revenues to 
fund programs and only look as far as the next budget cycle as a horizon. Programs need 
stable funding, usually over a long period of time to remain vital. Innovative funding 
strategies, nonprofit program status, and working with established civic programs that 
can provide emergency or operational funding, must be explored during the program’s 
design phase. 
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When asked what obstacles were in place that may have hampered or damaged 
the growth or successful operation of the program, both Leffler and Houston thought that 
their law enforcement colleagues posed a significant problem. Houston noted that law 
enforcement “cultural traditions,” in terms of allowing the private sector into the policing 
profession, were strongly opposed to inclusion. The strong, “us versus them” culture 
caused problems building relationships, and Miles said her fellow FBI agents did not take 
the program seriously and did not understand the value to the community or the Bureau. 
This deep-seated culture can be directly tied to many police officers’ perceptions 
of Community Oriented Policing (COP) programs that became popular in the late 1990s. 
Patrol officers believed the programs were “fluff” or a politically correct effort to appease 
the community’s fear of the police after negative press in the aftermath of the Rodney 
King riots in the early 1990s. Many police officers believed that in an era of reduced 
funding for law enforcement, spending time attending community meetings was not cost 
effective, and took valuable police resources off the street resulting in critical officer 
shortages. 
Understanding these cultural aspects of a law enforcement agency can be critical 
to the program’s success and communication with officers about how the relationships 
can benefit the department and the community should be enhanced when starting a 
private outreach program. 
Another error common to two of the programs was the failure to involve local law 
enforcement into the planning and operation of the program. The SHIELD and 
RUBICON programs both have a large geographic scope, involving numerous local and 
county law enforcement agencies. Houston and Leffler both noted that their agencies did 
a poor job of involving the local agencies when then delivered services into the local 
communities. 
Leffler reported that when RUBICON first started conducting critical 
infrastructure evaluations for private sector businesses, the security professionals 
involved were concerned about company secrets and did not want local law enforcement 
involved in the reviews. Leffler listened, and excluded local law enforcement 
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representatives from participating. She said this was a big mistake as local Sheriff’s and 
Police Chiefs resented their omission and made complaints. Houston echoed this concern, 
and said their office often alienated locals by meeting with important business leaders, 
and representing themselves as experts on security issues in that city. Again, this caused 
friction with local police leaders. 
Leffler and Houston’s experience in this area highlights the importance of 
understanding who your customers really are. When establishing a public outreach 
program, agencies must consider the wide-reaching impact of the program, and the down-
stream affect on other agencies and services. Most programs are not confined to a small 
jurisdiction, so networking and communication is critical to maintaining healthy 
relationships between law enforcement entities. 
Lastly, leadership was the most prominent factor that stood out when examining 
these three programs. All three program managers were intelligent, enthusiastic, and 
proud of their accomplishments. 
When queried about why their programs were successful, or what key features 
were implemented that worked well, the managers all talked about educating themselves, 
and tried to understand the underlying relationships and nuances that would give them an 
edge-up to advance their program. They all studied the details of successful programs, 
networked with other program managers, and asked to “job shadow” with other existing 
groups in an effort to learn what works and what fails.  
One of the most striking similarities between the interviews was the repeating theme 
finding the courage to ask questions of the public. All three managers made it a point to 
emphasize that law enforcement officers think they “know it all” because they routinely 
interact with the public during emergencies, and fail to really understand what makes a 
business tick. Regina Miles summarized this by stating, “Program managers need to 
understand their partners and make a concerted effort to learn the business landscape in their 
area. Talking to business leaders, security professionals, and technology specialists is 
difficult if you do not understand their unique jargon and concerns. The only way to learn 
about the business environment is to get out and talk to people!” 
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IV. FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS 
A. BACKGROUND 
On September 17, 2012, a focus group of subject-matter experts was assembled to 
analyze the interview responses of the program managers. The panel consisted of three 
law enforcement executives with over seventy years of combined experience in the field.  
Steven Briggs is currently the Drug Enforcement Administration Counsel for 
Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Alaska. He previously served as the Chief Counsel of the 
Oregon Department of Justice Criminal Division, overseeing a variety of criminal 
investigatory, prosecution and intelligence functions, including the state’s Terrorism 
Fusion Center, the Organized crime section, the District Attorney Assistance Section, the 
State Intelligence Center, and the Internet Crimes Against Children program. Mr. Briggs 
is an accomplished trial attorney having handled numerous high profile capital murder 
cases, twice receiving the Department of Justice Outstanding Service award, as well as an 
award from the National District Attorney Association. He has lectured nationally and 
internationally on a variety of topics including trial practice, terrorism, ethics, organized 
crime and fraud. Mr. Briggs is a graduate of Dartmouth College and the University of 
Oregon School of Law. 
Chris Gibson was appointed as the Oregon High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) program Executive Director on November 1, 2006. The HIDTA program is a 
federally funded counter-drug grant program administered by the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP). Prior to his appointment as Oregon HIDTA Director, Mr. 
Gibson served for 18 years in local law enforcement and achieved the rank of Deputy 
Chief of Police at the Beaverton City Police Department (A large suburb of Portland). 
Mr. Gibson graduated in 1990 from Portland State University with a Bachelor of Science 
degree in the Administration of Justice, and again in 2011 with an Executive Master of 
Public Administration. Mr. Gibson is also a graduate of the 205th Session of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s National Academy. 
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James C. Ferraris is an Oregon law enforcement veteran of nearly 34 years and is 
currently the Deputy Chief of Police of the Salem, Oregon Police Department, serving 
since 2011. James was previously employed by the Portland Police Bureau, having 
served in several executive level positions including Commander of the Police Bureau’s 
North Precinct from 2006 to 2011. He was responsible for the leadership of more than 
200 employees providing police services to 165,000 residents in a 63 square mile area, 
while managing a $24 million operating budget. Mr. Ferraris has many years of service as 
a Critical Incident Commander in charge of the Special Emergency Reaction Team 
(SERT), the Hostage Negotiations Team (HNT) and the Explosives Disposal Unit 
(EDU).  
In 2003, Mr. Ferraris was appointed as the Assistant Chief of Police in charge of 
the Investigations Branch, where for three years he led 350 employees, managed a $45 
million budget and provided oversight of all investigative functions. Mr. Ferraris is a 
graduate of the FBI National Academy, Session 201, and currently an executive board 
member of the Oregon Partnership, Inc. (an organization that promotes drug prevention) 
and the Oregon HIDTA Program.  
Prior to the focus group meeting, a spreadsheet was provided to each of the 
participants that containing the 54 questions asked of the program managers and their 
responses. (See list of questions in Appendix A)  In addition, the group was asked to 
consider the following questions: 
1. Would a nonprofit organization designed to support a public outreach 
program work in Oregon? 
2. What is your opinion about the importance of a policy board or oversight 
committee? 
3. Are Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) or other inter-agency 
agreements important to establishing a law enforcement program? 
4. Should all program participants be vetted? 
5. Would virtual participation work for this type of program? 
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6. Does the manager of this type of program have to be a sworn police 
officer or can a civilian employee be used? 
7. Most of these programs have a limited geographic scope…can a state 
agency handle these programs with a small number of employees? 
B. FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION 
During the focus group meeting, the participants discussed these eight topics in 
detail and produced the following recommendations based on their subject-matter 
expertise: 
1. Would a nonprofit organization designed to support a public outreach 
program work in Oregon? 
The participants provided three different views to this question. Briggs stated he 
is opposed to the government taking private donations of any kind, especially for small 
communities. The risk is that citizens could view the donations as an attempt to secure 
favoritism. In addition, the history of these donations is often available to the public, and 
can lead to an unwarranted allegation of favoritism, if the entity giving the money is also 
under suspicion of criminal or regulatory wrongdoing. 
Ferraris supports soliciting private donations under limited circumstances. For 
instance, private companies offer law enforcement grants, usually tied directly to the 
purchase of specialized equipment (computers, weapons, etc.). If the grants are 
competitive, this can remove the suspicion that the funds were donated to secure 
favorable treatment. 
Gibson stated nonprofit donations only work if you have a separate fiscal staff to 
monitor the funds. Once you start a donation program, the management and tracking of 
the funds is critical to the integrity of the program. If the fund is “blind” it is even better. 
If a person can donate and the operations manager and the program participants do not 




2. What is your opinion about the importance of a policy board or 
oversight committee? 
All three stated that a policy board or oversight committee should be a mandate. 
You need to have a buffer to provide liability protection, to have a sounding board for 
making major program changes, and to handle complaints or issues raised by outsiders 
and participants. Lastly, the board can be in place to hold program managers and 
participants accountable to policies, procedures, or by-laws. 
3. Are Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) or other inter-agency 
agreements important to establishing a law enforcement program? 
Briggs believes MOUs, or Letters of Agreement, are good but are not enforceable 
in regards to the stated legal penalties. They are important from a framework perspective 
in that the agreements lay out a course of conduct, or the terms of the program that can be 
used to enforce program goals, eliminate users that do not perform properly, and to 
educate outsiders, the press, or potential participants as to the operation integrity of the 
program. 
Ferraris says that nondisclosure agreements for private participants are critical. 
The agreements lay out a foundation for privacy issues, protected information, and other 
security arrangements. In addition, the agreements have the added value of scaring away 
people who might have ulterior motives regarding their participation in the program. 
4. Should all program participants be vetted? 
The consensus of the group is that some type of vetting is critical to operational 
integrity and the reputation of the program.  
Ferraris gave the example of a person participating in a program was found to be 
a known child predator. This information was exposed in the media, and it damaged the 
reputation of the program. He also stated that background checks have helped to expose 
bad actors, and people who attempted to infiltrate the program in an attempt to damage 
the program from within. Without the background checks, the people would not have 
been discovered. 
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Background checks also have the same affect as the Non-Disclosure Agreement, 
as they may scare away some people that have an ulterior motive to participate. People’s 
identities need to be verified, either by a simple National Criminal Information Center 
(NCIC) check or some type of interview and background query. 
5. Would “virtual” participation work for this type of program? 
Briggs says that virtual participation only works in a limited fashion, as personal 
relationships are the “heart and soul” of any successful program. Studies have shown that 
live, face-to-face contact with participants is critical, even if these occur on a limited 
basis. 
Gibson suggests a combination of virtual and live communications. For example, 
quarterly live meetings and training, supplemented by weekly email or message board 
communications. 
All three are interested in how social media can be leveraged in terms of 
messages, warnings, links to bulletins, etc. All believe these would work, if the program 
coordination does not get overwhelmed with the use. 
Ferraris is concerned about having participants log onto a proprietary system. He 
believes people are often overwhelmed at work already and having to log on to a system 
on a regular basis becomes tedious and results in deteriorating usage of the system. 
People need to be regularly engaged, and the program needs to drive the participation. 
6. Does the manager of this type of program have to be a sworn police 
officer or can a civilian employee be used? 
Gibson says it generally does not matter, but believes the “talent of the individual 
is more important than if they are a sworn or civilian employee.”   
Briggs says depending on whom the audience is, it could take some work for a 
civilian employee to gain confidence and trust of participants. If the participants are all 
civilians, it may not matter, but if some of the participants are retired LE, or current LE, 
then having some type of sworn presence could improve the trust level of the 
participants. 
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Ferraris stated the potential leader (regardless of their sworn status) needs to have 
some expertise in the field of the program. Mastery of the content, and the program 
features and goals, builds immediate trust and integrity. 
7. Most of these programs have a limited geographic scope…can a state 
agency handle these programs with a small number of employees? 
A major flaw of many programs is the program management “bites off more than 
it can chew.” The panel strongly recommended starting a program with a limited scope 
that participants and employees could master and build a level of expertise. If the agency 
cannot handle the program with a limited staff, management should be honest and 
evaluate whether or not they should establish the program with the existing staff levels.  
When features and services are added, managers should try to determine if the 
core mission can still be delivered without a drop off of service quality. If not, expanding 
will kill the program. Become “great” at the core mission, everything else is secondary 
and can damage the reputation and quality of the program. 
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V. FOCUS GROUP ANALYSIS 
A. FUNDING 
One of the serious issues facing law enforcement agencies today is paying for 
important programs and services during a decade of shrinking budgets and reduced 
federal grant funding. The focus group discussed this issue in great detail, primarily 
talking about alternative forms of funding like federal grants, business grants, and private 
donations. It was interesting that all three members of the group focused heavily on the 
appearance of impropriety that private funding can elicit. Mr. Briggs was chiefly 
concerned as he led the Oregon Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Division, which 
is the primary agency in Oregon that investigates political malfeasance and public 
corruption cases. He was concerned that private donations, regardless of how they were 
handled can lead to allegations of misuse and influence peddling.  
Blind trusts were discussed as a method to mitigate the potential for public 
scrutiny, but all three members ended the discussion with a recommendation that private 
funding should only be considered in limited circumstances where program managers can 
make specific purchases, such as special investigative equipment. This direct purchase 
strategy, coupled with transparent accounting practices, should thwart public concerns 
about the misuse of donated funding. 
B. LEADERSHIP 
Several of the questions posed to the group led to in-depth conversations about 
the importance of leadership and the host agency’s full understanding of the scope and 
function of the proposed program. The group strongly agreed that the selection of the 
program manager is the one decision that agency executives will make that has the most 
direct correlation to the eventual success of the program.  
Gibson and Briggs agreed that it did not matter if the manager for a private 
outreach program was a police officer or a civilian employee, but they would probably 
try to locate a sworn law enforcement officer to establish the program. This issue is 
important because sharing information with the private sector carries extensive legal and 
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operational burdens not commonly confronted by private companies and their employees. 
Extensive knowledge of state and federal intelligence laws and protocols is needed to 
protect sensitive information where the inadvertent dissemination could severely damage 
the agency’s reputation. For these reasons, the members stated they would lean towards 
hiring a police manager with experience in these topics, which would lend instant 
credibility to private participants.  
The panel emphasized that an agency should not begin the process of starting the 
program unit you have the perfect person to run it. Without the right person, with the 
right skill sets and experience, the program will probably fail. This sentiment was 
repeated throughout the panel discussions and became the focal point of almost every 
topic segment. The panel emphasized that most agencies make the mistake of selecting an 
existing employee who already heads the division where the new program will be placed. 
For instance, if the new program is an undercover vice program, the current manager of 
the investigations unit will often be put in command. Does the investigation’s manager 
have expertise in vice related cases?  Does he or she understand the complicated set of 
sex-crimes laws and court decisions that can doom a vice unit if not fully appreciated?  In 
the case of a private outreach program, many police managers have very little experience 
supervising civilian employees or working with the business community. Candidates 
within a police department that are involved in crime prevention, intelligence 
investigations, budget management, or other administrative functions should be 
considered when seeking a program manager. 
Agencies are reluctant to look outside of the agency for a new manager, as union 
pressures to hire from within, and the budget impact of adding an additional manager, are 
important considerations for many agencies. But, leadership often involves careful 
consideration of all options, and picking an existing manager to run a program without 
the proper training and expertise can often lead to program failure. Steve Briggs ended 






C. PROGRAM OVERSIGHT 
The discussion of program oversight was very short because all three panel-
members immediately agreed that a program of this type should never be established 
without a policy board or some type of oversight committee. Anytime a police agency 
establishes a program that is not a traditional law enforcement service, the chances of 
failure are high due to a host of factors including a lack of business and civilian 
management expertise. For these and many other reasons, gathering a group of business, 
government, and citizen members together to oversee a program provides a strong 
sounding board when making program adjustments, negotiating contracts, handling 
complaints, and setting the strategic course for the program. 
D. PROGRAM COMMUNICATION METHODS 
The panel members were concerned that many law enforcement agencies are 
beginning to rely too heavily on the Internet and other electronic mediums to 
communicate with the public. The main reason for concern was the reduction of personal 
interaction and the panel’s belief that the lack of face-to-face communication leads to 
weaker personal relationships that eventually will cause the program to fail. Chris Gibson 
put it best when he stated that program managers needed to focus heavily on how the 
participants interact with other sworn staff, and a delicate combination of virtual and live 
meetings needs to be established to enhance these relationships. Logging into a website 
on a regular basis does not build a healthy working relationship between law enforcement 
and the private sector. Personal relationships are a key factor in enhancing trust and open 
information exchange within the program.  
E. SMALL-AGENCY ISSUES 
It is easy to examine another agency that hosts a successful program, and say, “we 
can do that!”  Just because an agency has a successful program, does not mean you can 
replicate it, as the program has to fit your agency’s culture, budget, and mission for it to 
succeed. But law enforcement executives, especially from small agencies, often overlook 
the intricacies of a program and most importantly, the expertise and capabilities of the 
employees involved. Resources, processes, and values of a particular organization are 
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difficult to evaluate and measure from afar. When closely scrutinizing a successful 
function within a program, one or two employees often have the “it” factor: a 
combination of knowledge, experience, savvy, and interpersonal skills, that elevates the 
program to success. Executives need to honestly evaluate their own agency’s processes 
and values to see if the existing staff has the minimum set of skills for the job. If there is 
a shortage of expertise, this can drastically change the outlook for success. Additional 
training, mentoring, or hiring new staff who have the existing tools to do the job, must be 
explored prior to beginning the program.  
For these reasons, determining if the program can be operated without affecting 
the delivery of other core services needs to be examined and considered in great detail. 
Without comprehensive research and a thorough analysis of existing programs, 
employees, and resources, small agencies will be unable to clearly evaluate their ability 
to undertake this type of venture. 
F. MENTORING 
The focus group noted that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security hosts a 
series of professional mentoring programs for agencies establishing a variety of different 
programs. These programs include assistance in starting a fusion centers and emergency 
operations centers, fusion center and fire service information sharing programs, fusion 
liaison officer’s programs, fusion center outreach programs, critical infrastructure 
programs and fusion center health security coordination programs. The group highly 
recommended networking with U.S. DHS on these programs, as they pair agencies up 
with experienced managers who have started similar programs.  
Finding a mentor who has done it before and not “reinventing the wheel” was a 
repeated topic discussed by the panel. Executives should conduct extensive research into 
existing programs prior to beginning the planning process and not be afraid to copy these 
programs and involve the existing program’s managers into the planning of the new 
program. Even though the agency could be confident in the program’s planning direction, 
another agency may have established a similar program and save the planning process 
valuable time and energy. 
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G. PLANNING TEAM CONTINUITY 
The focus group recommended that executives and managers beginning the 
process of establishing a new outreach program fully understand the goals, program 
expectations and mission. Even though this sounds rudimentary, executives often assume 
that all parties involved in the initial planning of a program are “on the same page.”  
Hosting frequent planning meetings where the goals, expectations and mission are 
formally stated, documented, and agreed upon before hiring staff and expending program 
funds should be considered. These formalities are redundant but will often save the group 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
I am a firm believer in the people. If given the truth, they can be depended 
upon to meet any national crisis. The great point is to bring them the real 
facts. —Abraham Lincoln 
 
A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the 
opportunity in every difficulty. —Winston Churchill 
 
A. FINDINGS 
This research has examined the complex road travelled by executives and 
managers when trying to determine the most effective way to establish a law enforcement 
outreach program. With a focus on small police agencies and fusion centers established in 
smaller states or regions, fundamental elements, and key considerations emerged from 
the program manager interviews and focus group debates.  
The goal of this research was to answer three distinct questions: 
1. What are the fundamental program components fusion center program 
managers consider when developing a successful private partnership 
program? 
2. What smart practices can be employed when implementing a program for 
a small fusion center? 
3. What are the advantages and limitations of the electronic systems fusion 
centers use to collaborate with program participants? 
The process of interviewing the three program managers, and the focus group 
discussions and analysis, produced six significant findings. The findings are documented 
in three separate sections of this chapter. Question One is answered below. Due to the 
large number of smart practices identified, the findings related to Question Two will be 
enclosed in a separate document called the “Blueprint Guide.” This document will be 
attached as Appendix B. Question Three will be addressed below under in the 
“Communication Methods” section.  
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The consensus opinion of the subject-matter experts was that the following six 
topics should be carefully studied in great detail by any law enforcement agency prior to 
establishing a private sector outreach program.  
B. AGENCY SELF-EXAMINATION 
Admitting that you cannot do something is one of the most difficult things for 
government agency leaders to do. But when confronted with the directive to establish a 
program of any type, many leaders fail to look within the agency in an attempt to 
evaluate if they have the expertise, culture, and sustainable funding to accomplish the 
task at hand.  
Agency executives should start the process by asking themselves, “Are we the 
right agency to host this program?”  Competition between jurisdictions is fierce in the 
law enforcement culture, especially between state and local agencies, and the federal 
government. For this reason, many law enforcement leaders are reluctant to admit that 
they might not have the capability to manage the program successfully, and perhaps a 
neighboring agency, jurisdiction, or federal agency might be better equipped. 
Once an honest, analytical appraisal of the host agency has been completed, and it 
is determined that the agency is the right fit for the program, the process can move 
forward to examining the culture of the agency. 
C. AGENCY CULTURE 
The program manager interviews revealed that establishing private outreach 
programs was difficult because police officers had a mistrust of the private sector and did 
not understand the value of these partnerships. The program managers and focus group 
panel members believe a huge cultural shift is still needed before a successful partnership 
can be formed between law enforcement agencies and the business community.  
Agency executives should survey agency employees to determine the level of 
willingness to integrate private sector employees into their operational framework. If 
resistance to this approach is revealed, extensive training and education of existing staff 
is recommended prior to bringing private sector employees into the organization.  
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D. FUNDING 
Many law enforcement executives leave the issue of budgets and budget 
forecasting to professional fiscal staff, and rightfully so. However, the process of 
determining the startup cost of a program is complicated and the importance of securing 
sustainable, long-term funding is often overlooked.  
Understanding the scope of the program, and the number of employees needed to 
interact and manage the private participants is one of the key factors to an accurate 
budget forecast. A careful analysis of the business community in the agency’s 
jurisdiction, an evaluation of the existing critical infrastructure, and comparisons to other 
existing programs and their size and scope is critical to predicting costs. 
One of the difficulties of the budget process is attempting to forecast the growth 
of a program once the program is established and becomes popular. If private businesses 
see the program as important, more will want to join, creating the need for additional 
staff, supplies, and possibly office space. Anticipating expansion and the additional costs 
associated with managing people, providing meeting space, establishing communication 
methods, and other intrinsic costs will help management plan for the need of additional 
funding. 
The focus group panel recommended separating the budget process in two distinct 
phases: Begin with a “pilot program,” then transition to a formal, permanent program. 
This strategy will allow the agency to work with their host city, county or state 
government, and recognize the potential for expansion and the need for re-evaluating the 
cost of doing business during the transition period. 
E. COMMUNICATION METHODS 
One of the goals of this research was to examine the advantages and limitations of 
the electronic systems fusion centers use to collaborate with program participants. This 
analysis ended rather quickly, as the program managers conveyed enthusiastic opposition 
to using electronic collaboration tools as the sole means to interact with program 
participants. 
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The consensus of the program managers and the panel is that regular face-to-face 
communication is fundamental to building trusting relationships and the continued 
involvement of participants. 
In today’s busy world, the popular approach is to rely upon technology as a 
method to make communication more efficient and easier to manage. Program managers 
stated that when email and websites were used as platforms to communicate, 
participation would start out strong, but decline rapidly over time. A combination of 
methods needs to be employed, including frequent dissemination of publications and 
emails, and regularly scheduled in-person meetings and training events, to keep the 
interaction between all parties vibrant and productive. 
F. UNDERSTANDING THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The program managers felt that they, along with their law enforcement 
colleagues, all failed to fully understand how the private sector would interact with law 
enforcement, and what their concerns were regarding privacy issues, intellectual property 
rights, and the potential for corporate espionage.  
Understanding that competition and realizing profits is the goal of private 
enterprise, and that this process is in direct conflict with the idea of the open sharing of 
information with the government, is the first of many issues law enforcement agencies 
need to address before establishing a program. 
Again, obtaining training and education resources for management and staff 
involved in the program regarding these vital issues will be critical to the early success of 
the program. 
G. LEADERSHIP INVESTMENT 
The early involvement of law enforcement executives in private partnership 
initiatives is a key component to success. Program managers report that unlike many 
other law enforcement efforts, private outreach programs have a unique impact on the 
host agency, as they put business leaders in regular, direct contact with agency 
employees. If the agency leadership is not engaged in this interaction, business leaders 
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quickly become disenchanted and come to believe the agency is disinterested in their 
participation. In simple terms, agency executives need to show their enthusiasm for these 
programs by participating and leading by example. Show up to meetings, participate in 
round table discussions, and attend joint training. Do not establish the program if the 
agency leadership is not fully vested. 
In addition to the findings outlined above, a “Blueprint” guide containing 
recommendations and smart practices generated by the program managers and members 
of the focus group can be found in Appendix B. 
H. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As mentioned earlier, the recommendations and smart practices formulated by the 
program managers and subject-matter experts are contained in a separate document 
entitled, “A Blueprint Guide to Establishing a Public/Private Outreach Program.”   
In addition to these findings, this research has produced a number of questions 
and concerns that should be addressed in future studies.  
In general, law enforcement agencies do a poor job evaluating special programs. 
The difficulty of establishing accurate metrics to measure the value of relationships is one 
of the key reasons. Trusting relationships with the public, and other nontraditional law 
enforcement partner’s, leads to an increased flow of tips and intelligence. This 
information flow has led to the prevention of crime and increased the efficiency of 
criminal investigations at all levels of government. Unfortunately, this information is 
primarily anecdotal in nature, and very few statistics are generated for this topic. 
It is essential that law enforcement agencies improve the internal tracking of tips 
and leads, and openly report the anecdotal results as it applies to these private partnership 
programs. Reporting the success (or failures) of these programs with accurate data will 
highlight their value and bring them to the attention of key decision makers in the federal 
government. 
Conversely, very little attention has been focused on the value these programs 
impart on the private sector. Again, this could be attributed to the lack of metrics. 
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Business leaders “feel” these programs are beneficial to the participating companies and 
government agencies. Interacting with law enforcement agencies, establishing emergency 
operations plans, and creating mechanisms to report illegal activities are all positive 
outcomes for the participants. These outcomes should be measured and studied in a 
comprehensive way to determine if the federal government should maintain funding, and 
even potentially expand their support for these programs. 
Lastly, a comprehensive study is needed to focus on the effectiveness of 
electronic communication systems utilized by federal homeland security programs. 
Currently, different segments of the federal government (FBI, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice and the Military Services) use different, 
and often times competing electronic information sharing systems.  
State and local law enforcement agencies are forced to choose between the 
systems, creating competition and damaged relationships. In addition, a myriad of 
valuable services are hosted on these systems, and if agencies align themselves with one 
system or another, they may be missing critical information from another agency not 
participating on the current system.  
The federal government, or perhaps the Director of National Intelligence, should 
convene an intelligence-sharing panel to address this important issue. Topics to be 
discussed should include use by nontraditional law enforcement partners, prosecutors, 
and non-investigative police staff. These valuable criminal justice professionals are 
currently locked out of the criminal intelligence sharing cycle. 
I. CONCLUSION 
This research has validated the often-quoted idiom, “The devil is in the details.”  
Law enforcement executives attempting to establish a private sector outreach program 
(and do it correctly the first time) are in for a challenging endeavor. The process of 
making important decisions, however, does not have to occur within a vacuum. Gifted 
program managers have paved the road to success, and if agency leaders take the time to 
analyze smart practices and recognize the dynamics of key operational components that 
actually make a program successful, the process can be more effective and rewarding. 
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APPENDIX A. PROGRAM MANAGER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Questions for program managers: 
 
1. What is the size of the program (number of participants)? 
2. What is the current goal of the program (Intelligence Gathering/Situational 
awareness/ Training? 
3. Why did you start the program and what were the intended goals? 
4. Who determined how the program was initially designed?   
5. Did you use consultants or subject-matter experts? 
6. What agencies sponsor the program? 
7. What are the key features? 
8. What is the geographic scope? 
9. What was the total start-up cost? 
10. What are the yearly operational costs? 
11. How many employees are needed to manage the program? 
12. Who are the participants? 
13. Are particular critical infrastructure “sectors” considered as part of the 
process to select participants? 
14. How did you (or do you) choose what critical infrastructure sectors to 
target with your outreach?   
15. Do you target all 18? 
16. How do participants approach center management about problems, 
complaints or concerns about the program?   
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17. What is the process to respond to these issues? 
18. Are participants housed within your fusion center?   
19. If so, who pays for their equipment and supplies? 
20. If not housed within your center, how do the members participate? 
21. What types of companies targeted for participation? 
22. How are participants identified and chosen? 
23. What types of security protocols are in place for participants? 
24. How do you handle security violations with private partners? 
25. Are participants required to complete a background check or receive some 
level of official clearance? 
26. How do you address privacy concerns regarding your participants? 
27. What is the physical structure of the program (In fusion center/virtual/ live 
meetings)? 
28. What electronic collaboration tool is used? 
29. How does staff communicate with participants? 
30. Is a nationally recognized electronic such as HSIN or Infraguard used as a 
communication tool?   
31. If not, what do you use? 
32. What features of the system are most helpful in your outreach? 
33. Does your system have an audit tool? 
34. Does your system store tips and leads? 
35. Does your system allow you to forward information to the FBI or other 
investigative agencies? 
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36. How do you provide technical support for the system? 
37. How do you manage tips and leads generated by the participants? 
38. How do you share information with the participants? 
39. How is the program funded? 
40. Are private funds utilized?   
41. Is your program a non-profit? 
42. How is funding sustained? 
43. What types of products or publications does the program produce? 
44. Do you have a marketing method or strategy? 
45. What marketing plans have worked, and which ones have failed. 
46. What types of policy documents and agreements do you employ? 
47. What types of statistics do you track?   
48. How do you report accomplishments? 
49. What type of program oversight is in place? 
50. What mistakes were made when designing the program? 
51. What obstacles affected the program and how did you overcome or 
mitigate them? 
52. Can you give an example(s) of a case or situation where partnerships were 
exploited to initiate a criminal investigation or solve a case? 
53. What is your secret for enhancing relationships?   




Focus Group Interview Questions 
 
The focus group participants were asked to consider the following questions: 
 
8. Would a non-profit organization designed to support a public outreach 
program work in Oregon? 
9. What is your opinion about the importance of a policy board or oversight 
committee? 
10. Are memorandums of understanding (MOU) or other inter-agency 
agreements important to establishing a law enforcement program? 
11. Should all program participants be vetted? 
12. Would virtual participation work for this type of program? 
13. Does the manager of this type of program have to be a sworn police 
officer or can a civilian employee be used? 
14. Most of these programs have a limited geographic scope…can a state 
agency handle these programs with a small number of employees? 
 
 85 
APPENDIX B. BLUEPRINT GUIDE FOR ESTABLISHING 
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS IN SMALL 
FUSION CENTERS:  KEY PROGRAM COMPONENTS AND 
SMART PRACTICES 
The following “Blueprint Guide” is a compellation of suggestions and recommendations 
made by subject-matter experts who have established and managed law enforcement 
Public/Private Partnership Programs. The material should not be considered an all-
encompassing checklist, but a tool for managers to use in the planning phase of the 
project and to discuss and debate important topics. All suggestions made by the subject-
matter experts are their personal and professional opinions, based on years of experience 
managing similar programs.   
 
Building and Maintaining Relationships 
• Program leaders need to set aside their egos and work to establish partnerships with 
the private sector. One of the key strategies is to put in the effort to understand the 
role of the business in the community and get a firm grasp on what the business does 
everyday and how it impacts the city and state. This will allow you to have 
meaningful conversations with business leaders, and they will see you have done your 
homework and understand their value. 
 
• Program managers need to understand their partners and make a concerted effort to 
learn the business landscape in their area. Talking to business leaders, security 
professionals, and technology specialists is difficult if you do not understand their 
unique jargon and concerns. The only way to learn about the business environment is 
to get out and talk to people. 
 
• Build and maintain a high level of credibility. Being honest, transparent, 
straightforward and trustworthy buys a tremendous amount of credibility currency. 
 
• Never promise more than you can deliver. When you start a new program, and 
participants start to interact with your team and a level of trust is established, the 
participants will naturally ask for more services and products. The team’s natural 
inclination would be to step outside of the stated mission and try to help.   Try to 
avoid this as the everyday stress on a program involves delivering the main product, 
in this case complex security assessments. If dabbling in a side project reduces the 
main deliverable, your reputation for high quality of work will diminish. 
 
• Follow-up after a service is delivered.   This sends a message that you care, but also 
allows the business to share critical feedback on what parts of the program are 
working, and which ones do not. Management needs to review the feedback in an 
effort to make improvements in the program as it matures. 
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• Program managers and law enforcement participants need to show up to meetings and 
events as a team. Participants must see a team effort and cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies to build trust. 
 
• Program management must keep the participants engaged and constantly sharing or 
the program will falter. They (private sector participants) must feel they are part of 
the system, have a trusting relationship with other members and the sponsoring 
agency members, or you will lose them. 
 
• Allow participants to have input into the training agenda. ASK THEM what THEY 
want to learn. Don’t always assume your best topic is the one they want or need. 
Customize all training to the group. Do not cookie-cutter the training. 
 
• Program team members (law enforcement) must participate in public forums, 
Infragard chapter meetings, etc. Not just program managers or agency heads. Program 
participants want to hear from the real experts, not just the managers. 
 
• Learn who your audience is!  Work hard to create an open communication 
environment that builds trust. This will increase information flow and is the bedrock 
of any successful program. 
 
• Lastly, you must be all-inclusive. Every business should be able to participate. Small 
“mom and pop” stores are often very familiar with neighborhood problems and 
criminal activity, but are often overlooked by law enforcement outreach programs. 
The common practice is to focus on the biggest employer in the region, and even 
though that is very important, strategic businesses in areas not traditionally targeted 
for these programs might be more beneficial partners. Knowing the businesses in 
your geographic jurisdiction, and the value they might bring to the program is critical. 
 
Key Components and Services 
• The program should only specialize in one main service. If the program has to many 
features or services, you lose expertise and will need additional staff to handle it. 
 
• Be careful with participants. Attempting to recruit them as informants or intelligence 
sources could damage your program.   If members think you are always trying to 
obtain information from them, they will lose trust and not participate. Leave the 
intelligence gathering business to your investigative and fusion center colleagues. 
 
• Consider creating an emergency access list of subject-matter experts in all fields 
within your jurisdiction that can be contacted 24/7 during an emergency or crisis. 
Understand that business leaders usually want to help, and when they finally do 
receive that emergency call, they will tell everyone they know that the government 
reached out and asked for help. Dedication to the program is a two-way street. 
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• Attempt to work with existing business groups or associations. Downtown business 
groups, for example, are always trying to keep involved in civic issues, and crime and 
crime prevention issues are always important. If you can tap into an existing group, 
not only will you identify potential business customers, but also address security 
issues across a broad spectrum of businesses all in one place. Conversely, many of 
these groups are established based solely on the business category, for instance a 
technology business group. These sector-specific groups allow team members to feel 
the pulse of a particular sector and get a wide variety of expert opinions in one 
specific area. 
 
• Provide valuable tools to participants that they can put to use immediately. For 
instance, the InfraGard LA team produced a model emergency operations plan that 
businesses can customize with very little effort. These types of tools are great for the 
business and they achieve immediate results. 
 
• Consider establishing an “Infrastructure Liaison Officer Program.”  The InfraGard 
LA program created a program similar to the LAPD Archangel program. This group 
works in concert with the Infragard members and provides vulnerability assessments 
for businesses that participate in the program. 
 
• Provide free training as often as possible. The private sector’s main goal is to make 
money, and outside training opportunities are rarely provided. People generally are 
hungry for cutting-edge information, and feel engaged when they understand the 
threats and solutions if presented in a professional way. 
 
• Combine resources, especially other law enforcement groups like TLO’s or other first 
responders. If you allow these groups to mingle with the private sector, magic will 
happen. 
 
• Give strong consideration to operating the program as a “liaison program” only, as a 
buffer between the public and law enforcement. The program should not be seen as a 
crime-fighting, counterterrorism unit. This training/outreach role always makes the 
public more comfortable and elicits more participation and engagement. 
Choosing Participants 
• Do not be selective of the program participants. The guy who owns the gas station is 
probably the guy with the best view of the world. Do not leave him out. 
 
• Do not turn down anyone who wants to join. 
 
• Conducting background checks on participants does not have to be a burden. It is 
costly (often a very high hidden cost) and is not often functionally effective. You 




• The program must have complete political support from agency management and city 
or state leadership. The mindset should be, “This program is very important, our 
businesses and their security is very important, and you will not fail to provide this 
valuable service!” 
 
• All levels of agency and government management must have a complete 
understanding of the program, how it works, which businesses are targeted and why. 
This is key as the public will ask government leaders about the program, and if the 
official supports the program. If business leaders feel political leadership or agency 
executives do not understand or hold the program in high regards, they will not play. 
 
• Establish and maintain an engaged policy board or oversight committee. The 
members must take an active role in the operation and be “true believers” in the 
cause. Members who are there for personal enrichment must be removed as it is often 
obvious to members and creates a poor example. 
 
Key Planning Strategies 
• Admitting that you cannot do something is one of the most difficult things for 
government agency leaders to do. But when confronted with the directive to establish 
a program of any type, many leaders fail to look within the agency in an attempt to 
evaluate if they have the expertise, culture, and sustainable funding to accomplish the 
task at hand.   
 
• Agency executives should start the process by asking themselves, “Are we the right 
agency to host this program?”  Competition between jurisdictions is fierce in the law 
enforcement culture, especially between state and local agencies, and the federal 
government. For this reason, many law enforcement leaders are reluctant to admit that 
they might not have the capability to manage the program successfully, and perhaps a 
neighboring agency, jurisdiction, or federal agency might be better equipped.  
 
• Establishing private outreach programs is difficult because police officers often have 
a mistrust of the private sector and may not understand the value of these 
partnerships. Frequently, a huge cultural shift is needed before a successful 
partnership can be formed between law enforcement agencies and the business 
community.   
 
• Agency executives should survey agency employees to determine the level of 
willingness to integrate private sector employees into their operational framework. If 
resistance to this approach is revealed, extensive training and education of existing 
staff is recommended prior to bringing private sector employees into the organization.  
 
 89 
• If this is the first time starting a new program, consider investing in a professionally 
designed project management software program. There are low-cost software 
products available to help managers project costs, track tasks and goals, and set 
design milestones. Many of these programs include GANT charts to help participants 
visually see the project components and timelines. These programs also allow you to 
review your progress, and when you are done, go back and debrief the design plan to 
help improve the plan for the next big project. 
 
Important Agency Considerations 
• Give serious consideration how your new project will affect other programs and 
operations inside your agency. When a new project is being implemented, everyone’s 
eyes are on it and the agency is expending resources and manpower to get it 
established. But, in reality, funds and manpower are being diverted to the new 
program from existing programs or services. Consider the cascading affects of 
making decisions and how it affects other critical operations.   
 
• Understand the premise that law enforcement does not know everything and has a lot 
to learn from the private sector. It is a critical mistake is to go into a business and 
pretend to know what they do and what the threats are. Don’t be afraid to learn. It’s 
good! 
 
• One of the most important functions is to act in support of the local law enforcement 
agency!  Do not alienate the locals by coming in and presenting yourself as the all-
knowing expert on security issues. 
 
Budget and Funding Considerations 
• Many law enforcement executives leave the issue of budgets and budget forecasting 
to professional fiscal staff, and rightfully so. However, the process of determining the 
startup cost of a program is complicated and the importance of securing sustainable, 
long-term funding is often overlooked.   
 
• Understanding the scope of the program, and the number of employees needed to 
interact and manage the private participants is one of the key factors to an accurate 
budget forecast. A careful analysis of the business community in the agency’s 
jurisdiction, an evaluation of the existing critical infrastructure, and comparisons to 
other existing programs and their size and scope is critical to predicting costs. 
 
• One of the difficulties of the budget process is attempting to forecast the growth of a 
program once the program is established and becomes popular. If private businesses 
see the program as important, more will want to join, creating the need for additional 




costs associated with managing people, providing meeting space, establishing 
communication methods, and other intrinsic costs will help management plan for the 
need of additional funding. 
 
• Strongly consider separating the budget process in two distinct phases: Start with a 
“pilot program” then transition to a formal, permanent program. This strategy will 
allow the agency to work with their host city, county or state government, and 
recognize the potential for expansion and the need for re-evaluating the cost of doing 
business during the transition period. 
 
• Consider establishing a non-profit or other mechanism to generate private funding for 
the program. Nationally, politicians and civic leaders do not yet understand the value 
of these programs and are reluctant to provide the appropriate funding. Private 
donations, fund raising events, and user fees are examples of ways to raise money to 
purchase supplies, pay for training venues, and buy needed equipment. 
 
• With this in mind, consider utilizing private funding in limited circumstances where 
program managers can make specific purchases (such as special investigative 
equipment). This direct purchase strategy, coupled with transparent accounting 
practices should thwart public concerns about the misuse of donated funding. 
 
Communication Methods 
• Regular face-to-face communication is fundamental to building trusting relationships 
and the continued involvement of participants. 
 
• In today’s busy world, the popular approach is to rely upon technology as a method to 
make communication more efficient and easier to manage. A combination of methods 
needs to be employed, including frequent dissemination of publications and emails, 
and regularly scheduled in-person meetings and training events, to keep the 
interaction between all parties vibrant and productive. 
 
• Social media and websites are important in today’s technological world. If you do not 
have a website or some type of alternative media position, you will lose out on 
potential participants.  websites are the easiest way to reach people with a minimal 
amount of staff. The content on the sites can include marketing information, meeting 
announcements, and training opportunities. (But do not forget that face-to-face 
communication is still critical). 
 
• If possible, send your publications and bulletins directly to the user. Do not just post 
them on a website and force them to log-on to access them. People are too busy and 
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